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Article 
Market-Based Innovation in Consumer Protection 
KELLI ALCES WILLIAMS 
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, low-income borrowers have 
been virtually shut out of the housing market. The spectacular failure of overzealous 
subprime lending at the beginning of the century is the culprit. Creditworthy 
borrowers exist in that underserved population, though regulation and the 
continued dominance of traditional banks in the mortgage market have conspired 
to deny those borrowers access to credit. 
A market solution to this problem exists and is gaining momentum. Financial 
technology firms have begun to focus on the borrower experience and to create tools 
to help unsophisticated borrowers navigate complex financial products. This Article 
takes that trend a step further and anticipates market innovations that will broaden 
the population of eligible borrowers. These market innovations can overcome 
regulatory missteps to both enhance efficiency and provide meaningful protections 
to consumers that regulation has failed to deliver. 
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. First, it shows how 
mortgage regulation has simply excluded the market participants it was intended to 
protect, thereby denying them the social and economic advantages of 
homeownership. Second, it shows how fintech has begun to work around those 
regulatory limitations to respond to the problems that led to the financial crisis by 
offering simpler products directly to consumers and providing more access to 
information. Third, it offers a market-based solution to the market and regulatory 
failures that anticipates the direction of fintech innovations. Finally, it argues that 
the thoughtful application of common law doctrines may be a more effective way to 
provide necessary consumer protections while allowing market forces to adapt to 
changing circumstances and emerging technology. 
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Market-Based Innovations in Consumer Protection 
KELLI ALCES WILLIAMS * 
INTRODUCTION  
Every day, consumers and investors make difficult or complex decisions 
that they do not really understand. Within our consumer financial markets, 
there are both experts and people who—facing very high stakes—
desperately need help understanding. In a free market, putting those people 
together so that the knowledgeable can help the uninitiated should not be 
difficult; it should be inevitable. Nevertheless, fundamental problems with 
how consumers come to understand products or investments remain and 
seem intractable.  
The consumer finance market is ripe for disruption. The most significant 
financial decision that most Americans make is the purchase of a home. With 
the housing market rebounding1 and mortgage regulation likely to diminish,2 
the current climate presents an excellent opportunity for enterprising 
technology companies to change the way Americans borrow money to 
purchase homes. The financial crisis of 2008 and the regulations it inspired 
have pushed lenders to be more conservative, effectively drying up credit 
for lower-income borrowers. There are profitable credit risks among those 
potential borrowers, but the providers of the loans and the potential 
borrowers are not connecting. 
This Article explains the existence and persistence of these two market 
failures in one of our largest and most-studied industries. It anticipates 
market solutions given innovative activity in the consumer finance markets 
by financial technology (“fintech”) companies and devises a legal 
framework that will protect the advances made by those innovators. More 
specifically, it argues that over-specificity in regulation has entrenched 
expensive, inefficient, and ineffective intermediaries between homebuyers, 
sellers, and lenders.  
                                                                                                                     
* Matthews & Hawkins Professor of Property, Florida State University College of Law. For helpful 
comments and conversations about this project, I thank Brian Galle, Donald Langevoort, Saul Levmore, 
Nadia Nasser-Ghodsi, Manuel Utset, Zachary A. Kramer, and participants in a workshop at the Florida 
State University College of Law. I am indebted to Marcos Hernandez, Alexander Purpuro, Christina 
Strasser and Taylor Westfall for excellent research assistance. 
1 Reuven Glick et al., What’s Different about the Latest Housing Boom?, FRSBF ECON. LETTER 
2015-34 at 2 (Nov. 16, 2015) (“[As of 2015], the median house price has recovered to a level that is only 
8% below its prior peak.”). 
2 See Alan Rappeport & Emily Flitter, Congress Approves First Dodd-Frank Rollback, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 23, 2018, at A1 (detailing the first of many promised repeals of the Dodd-Frank Act that, in part, 
strengthened mortgage regulation). 
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The housing market is a good motivating example to explore problems 
with the regulation of intermediaries. Kathryn Judge has highlighted the 
ways a variety of market intermediaries build and use political power to 
entrench themselves and the high fees they demand.3 This Article draws on 
some of her insights to reveal the mess of disloyal intermediaries that the 
housing industry has become, lacking anyone clearly motivated to help 
consumers. The housing market provides particularly fertile ground for 
exploration of these problems because the stakes for consumers are so high 
and the practices are so heavily regulated and therefore are firmly 
entrenched. Change seems difficult, and yet, various firms are well-
positioned to side-step regulation to provide better services directly to 
consumers at a much lower cost than the traditional market. 
The market must overcome the entrenchment of real estate and mortgage 
intermediaries who do not have incentives, and may not even be permitted, 
to serve the interests of buyers. Even the real estate agents who show homes 
to buyers and submit offers on behalf of buyers are agents of sellers.4 Over 
time, states have enacted regulations to try to balance the duties agents owed 
sellers and buyers, but the landscape is still murky and most of the players 
misunderstand who owes what duties to whom.5 Once a buyer has succeeded 
in signing a contract on a home, she faces the task of quickly procuring 
financing. The mortgage lender agent with whom she will work represents 
the bank originating the loan, and that bank usually plans to sell the loan to 
yet another bank or a group of investors. Agency costs abound, and they 
rarely break in favor of the borrower. 
Consumer lending, particularly for large loans like home mortgages, is 
deeply flawed. Strict regulations prevent innovation in mortgage loan terms 
and effectively exclude large portions of the population from qualifying for 
home loans at all.6 Consumers still have little or no help navigating the 
complex mortgage application process, and many may not know how large 
                                                                                                                     
3 See generally Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (2015) (discussing 
the influence that market intermediaries exert over business transactions). 
4 See Royce de R. Barondes & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Examining Compliance with Fiduciary 
Duties: A Study of Real Estate Agents, 84 OR. L. REV. 681, 682 (2005) (describing agency in the 
traditional model). 
5 Ann Morales Olazábal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of 
State Regulatory Responses, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 66 (2003) (describing the confusion over agency 
between seller and buyer). 
6 By its own admission, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau curtailed innovations that might 
help consumers by adopting specific regulations for mortgage underwriting. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 
LLP, Regulatory Guidance Regarding FinTech Products and Services: OCC White Paper and New 
CFPB Policy Clarify Regulatory Expectations for Financial Institutions and Other Market Participants 
5 (Apr. 5, 2016), available at 
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Regulatory_Guidance_Regarding_Fi
ntech_Products_and_Services.pdf (explaining the lower fees charged by Redfin as compared to 
traditional brokerages). 
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of a loan, and what loan terms, are most appropriate for them. We still lack 
an understanding of what a truly “consumer friendly” mortgage would look 
like. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has called for 
innovative approaches that will open the mortgage market to lower-income 
borrowers yet again.7 Presumably, market participants have had enough time 
to reflect on the financial crisis and have learned valuable lessons from the 
mistakes of the early 2000s. 
There appears to be a trend in fintech toward developing firms that may 
more effectively serve homebuyers. Real estate listing sites offer real estate 
agent services at much lower fees than traditional brokerages.8 Mortgage 
lenders are devising ways to communicate more quickly with borrowers, 
offering them loans with simple terms and lower fees.9 Other firms have 
specialized in providing advice to borrowers that is both general and, in 
some ways, specific. They have developed internet applications, supported 
by the option to chat online with experts, who help home buyers navigate 
house hunting, home buying, and the mortgage application process while 
also providing access to real estate agents, mortgage lenders, and even 
moving companies.10 A firm focused on serving borrowers with different 
degrees of creditworthiness might discover an under-appreciated market.  
These fintech firms show how a company designed to identify a broader 
range of borrowers—including lower-income borrowers—could provide 
information, guidance, easy-to-understand loan choices, and support while 
matching borrowers to lenders offering loans with appropriate terms. This 
Article takes stock of the consumer financial services market and suggests a 
natural progression that could lead to such a buyer’s (or borrower’s) side 
intermediary (“BSI”). The ideas being tested in fintech right now reveal a 
path to an eventual BSI and show how a BSI may serve the needs of 
borrowers without compromising the ability to repay lenders. Most 
importantly, this Article shows how the development of fintech in consumer 
financial services has so far avoided the pitfalls of prior intermediaries. In 
particular, fintech firms have not yet successfully lobbied for regulation that 
would entrench its position in the market and lead to pernicious path-
dependence.11 
                                                                                                                     
7 Id. at 4. 
8 See, e.g., How You Save With Redfin, REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/why-redfin-how-you-save 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (claiming a total commission of 4.5% through Redfin, as opposed to a total 
commission of 6% through a traditional brokerage). 
9 See, e.g., ROCKETMORTGAGE, https://www.rocketmortgage.com/purchase/get-started (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2018) (claiming to have “[r]einvented the [a]pproval [p]rocess” and promising loan approval 
“in minutes”); SOFI MORTGAGE LOANS, https://www.sofi.com/mortgage-loan/ (last visited Aug. 16, 
2018) (offering a “painless” process that simply and quickly provides consumers with funds). 
10 See, e.g., DOORSTEPS, https://www.doorstepsbuy.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (providing 
resources to home buyers with an open channel of communication to real estate agents). 
11 See Judge, supra note 3, at 632–33 (noting how intermediaries lobby for regulations that entrench 
their positions and the high fees they demand). 
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To be sure, market forces have failed mortgage borrowers in the past, as 
the financial crisis of 2008 is startling proof. The law should not turn its back 
on the vulnerable in these significant financial transactions. Fintech firms 
are likely to follow in the footsteps of other technology startup companies 
to try to change the law to suit their businesses. Uber is a leader in what 
Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry call “regulatory entrepreneurship,” that 
is, the practice of some firms of making regulatory change a significant part 
of their business plan.12 Regulatory entrepreneurship is evidence that 
regulation can hamper the market and that businesses may try to influence 
lawmakers to enact rules that favor them, often to the disadvantage of other 
businesses or even consumers. Pollman & Barry’s observations combined 
with Judge’s reveal the dangers of the strong influence of the regulated in 
the promulgation of specific regulation. This Article argues that the 
relatively flexible common law should dominate to the extent possible, with 
regulation only filling the spaces where the common law cannot reach. 
This Article makes several contributions to the literature. In order to 
make a new observation about the function of regulation and common law 
as they apply to intermediaries, it uses mortgage lending as an example 
because the mortgage industry is subject to evolving levels of regulation and 
is a market that is experiencing real innovation while its relatively 
unsophisticated consumers try to find the services they need. The Article 
reveals how regulation has perpetuated practices that can harm mortgage 
borrowers. It contributes to the literature on fintech and startup firms by 
finding new businesses and new practices by established businesses 
springing up through the cracks of the traditional system and the regulations 
that govern it. Anticipating where these innovations might be headed, the 
Article offers a market-based solution to the problems keeping many 
potential and new homebuyers from successfully participating in the 
mortgage market. Finally, it contributes to recent literature on how 
businesses influence the regulations that govern them and finds that the 
common law may be best able to protect the vulnerable while allowing 
market innovation to flourish.  
Part I of this Article explains the problems affecting home buyers in the 
current consumer finance market. It begins by explaining the difficulty the 
current mortgage market has in balancing ability to repay with access to 
funds. In response to the over-lending of the last decade, the “ability to 
repay” regulations limiting mortgage lending in the Dodd-Frank Act may 
have led to under-lending.13 While ability to repay is important to both 
                                                                                                                     
12 Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 
385 (2017). 
13 See Jason Scott Johnston, Do Product Bans Help Consumers? Questioning the Economic 
Foundations of Dodd-Frank Mortgage Regulation, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 677 (2016) (“While 
there are certainly other factors contributing to some recent trends in the housing market, Dodd-Frank 
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lenders and borrowers, too strict a definition can prevent the market from 
lending at the optimal rate and under optimal terms.14  
Part II explains that we should adjust the way we think of commercial 
lending relationships, particularly those that lead to securitized loan 
obligations. In those situations, we can think of the borrower both as an 
issuer of a security and a buyer of a financial product. As members of a 
widely dispersed, poorly represented group in transactions with 
sophisticated and/or well-diversified parties on the other side, these 
borrowers/buyers do not have the same kind or degree of protection as 
similarly situated investors. With large groups of “buyers” on both sides of 
most modern mortgage transactions, it is important to have adequate 
representation and opportunities for education about the transaction 
available for all interests. A real BSI has the potential to do that work, and 
new and existing firms are beginning to respond to that need. Specifically 
regulating by industry can result in incorrectly categorizing a transaction and 
failing to provide appropriate protections. 
Part III of this Article explores how intermediaries who are in positions 
to help unsophisticated consumers have failed to do so and explains how 
regulation failed to prevent, and possibly even perpetuated, the harm. 
Learning more about those intermediaries and attempts to deliver different 
kinds of services to borrowers will help us anticipate the next BSI and to 
design it in such a way as to avoid the pitfalls of the past. It particularly takes 
issue with the mortgage broker design and holds mortgage brokers up as an 
example of the expensive and harmful effects of specific regulation of 
intermediaries whose allegiances are not truly aligned with the buyers they 
purport to represent. 
Part IV takes stock of the consumer finance market and anticipates likely 
next steps. It focuses on the kinds of services firms are beginning to offer 
and what consumers seem to want. Part V then proposes a business model 
for a BSI. The BSI imagined by this part of the Article may never exist and 
its specific contours are not the Article’s aim. Rather, thinking through how 
such a firm should operate and how the market could lead to an intermediary 
that helps buyers more and is still profitable helps us understand the proper 
role of the law in solving the significant problems posed by our current 
methods of guiding consumers through difficult financial transactions.  
Part VI argues that a common law framework best supports the 
beneficiaries of intermediaries’ services. It explains how common law 
                                                                                                                     
has likely decreased subprime mortgage lending, increased renting, and has led to an increase in other 
types of lending.”); Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore 
Private Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 171–72 (2012) (detailing 
how, during the housing bubble, mortgage lenders overpriced mortgages whereas, after Dodd-Frank, 
there is a persistent problem of underpricing the risk). 
14 See Johnston, supra note 13, at 678–79 (describing how a rigid definition of the ability to repay 
has substantially limited the types of mortgages offered to poorer and higher risk consumers). 
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principles can protect consumers and avoid regulatory capture that has 
plagued the industry in the past. Finally, it argues that specific regulation 
may be necessary in some circumstances, but that that regulation must be 
limited to addressing problems that the common law cannot. Before enacting 
regulation that will apply to one industry, we must ask why the law is not 
already addressing the particular problem. And if we discover that it simply 
cannot, only then is specific regulation recommended.  
I. FAILURES IN THE LENDING MARKETS 
A surplus of mortgage loans in the early 2000s caused a bubble in 
housing prices that led to the 2008 financial crisis. When that bubble burst, 
creditors were no longer able to cover the loans they had made by 
foreclosing upon homes, consumers could not use equity in the homes to 
refinance, and borrowers who had received loans they could not realistically 
repay defaulted in large numbers.15 Lenders were unable to recoup their 
losses. An active derivatives market left most major American financial 
institutions exposed to the significant losses in the mortgage markets, which 
were on the brink of failure.16 
A number of behavioral biases and poor predictions by borrowers and 
lenders17 caused the over-lending problem.18 Both borrowers and lenders 
relied on the faulty assumption that housing prices would rise forever.19 The 
assumption that home values would serve as adequate collateral for any loan, 
no matter how risky, supported the decision to consummate a number of 
dubious loans. The securitization of loans also contributed to over-lending. 
                                                                                                                     
15 See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 5 
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 549, 567 (2009) (“As marginal borrowers who were now forced to pay higher rates 
began to default on their mortgages, the air quickly came out of the real estate bubble as subprime 
borrowers were forced into foreclosure.”); Steven L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Financial 
Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 549, 551–52 (2009) (“When home prices stopped appreciating, these borrowers 
could not refinance; in many cases, they defaulted . . . . These defaults in turn caused substantial amounts 
of low investment-grade mortgage-backed securities to default . . . .”). 
16 Indeed, two major investment banks did fail: Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns. Edward J. 
Estrada, The Immediate and Lasting Impacts of the 2008 Economic Collapse—Lehman Brothers, 
General Motors, and the Secured Credit Markets, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (2011).  
17 “Lenders” in this Article refers to the source of capital for mortgage loans. Lenders may be banks 
or fintech firms or other private firms and are often ultimately the purchasers of mortgage-backed 
securities. 
18 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 1073, 1121–22 (2009) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts] (finding that the 
complexity of mortgage contracts misleads the “imperfectly rational” borrower); Susan Block-Lieb & 
Edward Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 465, 466 
(2009) (“Conflicts of interest and gatekeeper failures on the supply side led to overlending [sic]. But 
errors in consumer decision making and the absence of demand-side institutions to protect consumers 
also led to overborrowing.”). 
19 Melissa Schulz, Note, VI. The Subprime Crisis: A Breeding Ground for Litigation, 27 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 307, 308 (2008); Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 550. 
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Because the originators of loans were not holding them for repayment, nor 
servicing the loans themselves, they lacked “skin in the game” and had 
incentives to originate risky loans that they could then package with safer 
loans and sell to investors as mortgage-backed securities.20 If housing prices 
had increased as everyone assumed they would, borrowers would have been 
able to use the equity in their homes to refinance their mortgages on more 
favorable terms. Mortgage originators21 could sell the loans off long before 
repayment became a concern—indeed, before payments were due in many 
cases. Even holders of mortgage-backed securities felt protected by the 
diversified portfolio of loans they held and their ability to recover the value 
of unpaid loans from foreclosure sales.22 
Professor Oren Bar-Gill has explained in detail how lenders framed 
mortgage loans in terms that would exploit the behavioral biases of 
borrowers to entice them to take loans that looked inexpensive early in the 
loan term, but ended up being less affordable in the long term.23 Lenders 
were able to make loans seem affordable by designing mortgage products 
with low upfront costs, such as interest-only loans24 or adjustable-rate 
mortgages.25 These loans often contained pre-payment penalties that 
significantly increased the cost of refinancing, high overall interest rates, and 
high penalty fees to which low-income borrowers were more likely to 
succumb than others.26 Bar-Gill argued that the ability of lenders to take 
                                                                                                                     
20 Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6–7 (2011); see 
also Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 68 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14358, 
2008), www.nber.org/papers/w14358.pdf (acknowledging “originate-to-distribute” as the idea that 
“banking has changed in such a way that the incentives have been fundamentally altered”). 
21 Mortgage originators may be the banks that are lending the money and either keeping the loan 
themselves or selling it to another financial institution. They may also be mortgage brokers. The 
mortgage originator is the party that guides the borrower through the application process and identifies 
the loan the borrower will receive. 
22 Zachary A. Kisber, Reevaluating MERS in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis, 42 REAL EST. L.J. 
183, 187–88 (2013) (“By the 2000s, mortgage-backed securities, many of which were subprime, were 
sold and traded in large volumes on the secondary market.”). 
23 Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1109–10. 
24 The borrower only pays the interest on the mortgage through monthly payments for a fixed term. 
Once this term is over, the borrower will either refinance his/her home, make a lump sum payment, or 
begin to pay off the principle of the loan. Margaret Graham Tebo, Unconventional Wisdom, 91 A.B.A. 
J. 49, 52 (2005); see also Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1076 (“Interest-only loans and 
payment-option ARMs allowed for zero or negative amortization during the introductory period, further 
increasing the step-up in the monthly payment after the introductory period ended.”). 
25 ARMs are mortgages with an interest rate that can change periodically. This change occurs 
“usually in relation to an index, and payments may go up or down accordingly. . . . It’s a trade-off—you 
get a lower initial rate with an ARM in exchange for assuming more risk over the long run.” FED. 
RESERVE BD., CONSUMER HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES 4 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201204_CFPB_ARMs-brochure.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2017); see 
also Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1098–99 (detailing how the alternating interest rate 
resulted in substantially increased mortgage payments). 
26 Bar-Gill, Mortgage Contracts, supra note 18, at 1101–02.   
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advantage of these behavioral biases led to more lending to low-income 
borrowers and on much more disadvantageous terms than the market could 
sustain.27 
More generally, the financial services and lending markets are hard on 
low income, subprime borrowers. The natural entropy of the market seems 
to lead to giving subprime borrowers loans they cannot afford and could 
never hope to repay while profiting from high fees and interest payments.28 
Industry after industry—from payday lending29 to car sales to higher 
education30—has sought out borrowers with risky credit profiles, promised 
them access to cash, opportunities, and/or ways out of poverty, only to 
saddle them with debts equal to several times the amount of principal 
borrowed.31 Borrowers with debilitating debt loads often dig even deeper, 
assuming they could never repay anything they borrow, so they are 
borrowing as much as they can just to stay afloat.32 They begin to rely 
heavily on the income stream provided by debt and fall farther into financial 
ruin.33 These tendencies of both lenders and borrowers seem opposed to the 
goal of finding and lending to responsible, low-income borrowers loans they 
can reasonably afford to repay.  
Without government intervention, predatory lending seems almost 
inevitable. Any hopes that lenders have incentives to be repaid are dashed 
when the reality of subprime lending reveals the opposite. Securitization of 
consumer loans removes the connection between the original lender and the 
                                                                                                                     
27 Id. at 1121–22. 
28 See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7–11 (2008) 
(arguing the consumer credit markets are failing because imperfectly rational consumers have imperfect 
information and cannot avoid agreeing to credit contracts that are harmful to them); Elizabeth Warren, 
The New Economics of the American Family, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 34–37 (2004) (noting the 
extremely high interest costs and fees associated with subprime loans relative to prime loans and 
describing the marketing strategies that targeted subprime borrowers and encouraged them to engage in 
expensive refinancing of their mortgages). 
29 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 44, 55 (explaining how consumer irrationality pervades 
the payday lending business); LISA SERVON, THE UNBANKING OF AMERICA: HOW THE NEW MIDDLE 
CLASS SURVIVES 77, 81 (2017) (noting that payday loans are illegal in fifteen states); Creola Johnson, 
Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 98 (2002) (referring to 
payday lending as “economic exploitation”). 
30 See Susan Dynarski, A Conveyor Belt of Dropouts and Debt at For-Profit Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 2016, at BU6 (explaining that the loans many students take at for-profit colleges often lead to 
default). 
31 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 34–35, 44; Johnson, supra note 29, at 26. 
32 See Derek Thompson, Your Brain on Poverty: Why Poor People Seem to Make Bad Decisions, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2013/11/your-brain-on-
poverty-why-poor-people-seem-to-make-bad-decisions/281780/ (discussing research that finds that 
persistence in pursuing long term goals, such as saving, can be affected by the decision maker’s 
perception of the long term—how long they have to wait and if they think saving will ever be effective). 
33 Id. (citing Anandi Mani et al., Poverty Impedes Cognitive Function, 341 SCI. 976, 976–80 (2013), 
which reports findings that living in poverty has a similar cognitive effect to losing an entire night’s sleep 
and adversely affects the decision making of poor people). 
 
 2019] MARKET-BASED INNOVATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION 165 
eventual repayment of the debt. Fees and high interest rates compensate 
lenders beyond the repayment of principal.34 Indeed, the credit card industry 
has long known that cardholders who pay their balance in full every month 
are not a source of income for the company.35 When regulation tries to rein 
in predatory lending, lenders simply reinvent it.36  
Government regulation responds as each new instance of predatory 
lending gains prominence, but market forces seem incapable of stopping 
predatory lending practices before they reach large numbers of borrowers. 
Borrowers seem unable or unwilling to select away from predatory loans. It 
is possible that lenders and borrowers both understand that a subprime 
borrower is already in financial trouble, desperately needs capital, and is 
unlikely to be able to repay any loan. Lenders have to make sure that they 
are able to profit, and borrowers only need to secure financing, no matter the 
source or the terms. A borrower will not go to jail for a failure to repay 
debts.37 Bankruptcy is available often enough; debt collectors can be 
prohibited from calling.38 If borrowers are going to freely borrow more 
money than they can repay, lenders might think they need protection. 
Designing terms to assure profits of some variety is what lenders receive for 
making capital available to people who would otherwise be barred from 
many sources of economic advancement. In these subprime markets, 
borrowers and lenders alike are behaving opportunistically. Under such 
                                                                                                                     
34 See James H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FINANCIAL SERVICES 
IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: ISSUES AND ANSWERS 31, 31–32 (Fannie Mae Found. Ed., 2001) 
(discussing the high interest rates associated with predatory lending). 
35 E.g., How do Credit Card Companies Make Money — The Business Model, WALLETBUDDY 
(May 10, 2017), https://medium.com/walletbuddy-insights/how-do-credit-card-companies-make-
money-the-business-model-d4892d301ac3. 
36 For-profit higher education seems to be at the forefront of convincing people to borrow money 
they cannot afford to repay by promising a future that will help them repay it, knowing full well that the 
likelihood of a profitable future is extremely low. Stephanie Riegg Cellini & Nicholas Turner, Gainfully 
Employed? Assessing the Employment and Earnings of For-Profit College Students Using Administrative 
Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22287, 2018). For-profit colleges are usually 
not able to offer their students the same kinds of future employment opportunities as their better-
established non-profit counterparts. Id. Still, federally subsidized student loans fund tuition for 
educational programs regardless of the quality of the school, its reputation, or its ability to place graduates 
in jobs after graduation. Unscrupulous schools attract students and their ability to bring in federal dollars, 
then watch as those students, rather predictably, drop out of the program before completing it or are 
unable to find a job that allows them to repay the loans. See Dynarski, supra note 30 (noting that it is not 
the lender—the federal government—that is necessarily taking advantage of students, but the school that 
is taking advantage of both the borrower and the lender by promising a profitable future it cannot deliver). 
37 Matt Tatham, Can You Go to Jail for Not Paying Your Bills?, EXPERIAN (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/can-you-go-to-jail-for-not-paying-your-bills/. 
38 Can a Debt Collector Try to Collect on a Debt That Was Discharged in Bankruptcy?, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (updated Oct. 25, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/can-a-
debt-collector-try-to-collect-on-a-debt-that-was-discharged-in-bankruptcy-en-1425/; See also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692d (2012) (noting that a debt collector may not make phone calls “repeatedly or continuously with 
intent to annoy, abuse, or harass”). 
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circumstances, it seems as though predatory lending is a sort of 
equilibrium.39 
If it is an equilibrium, it is not a healthy one for lenders, borrowers, or 
the credit markets as a whole. Businesses that do not add value are propped 
up on the government’s dime in the case of federally guaranteed loans. 
Unaffordable extravagances are funded with more enthusiasm than basic 
necessities, rendering basic necessities more difficult to afford as debt 
accumulates. Inability to repay debts is not always life-altering, but evictions 
and home foreclosures are significant hardships. Once the cycle of over-
borrowing begins, it is difficult, if not impossible, to end without a bailout 
from a third party—often the government, through federal guarantees or the 
availability of bankruptcy protection—with all of the moral hazards that 
entails for both sides of the transaction.40  
Thus, it would appear that not all equilibriums are net social benefits.41 
Subprime borrowing and industries built around giving low income, low 
credit score borrowers the illusion of participating in the middle and upper 
classes create negative externalities.42 Borrowers might behave differently if 
they could properly appraise the future payoffs. A strong optimism bias 
prevents borrowers from accurately pricing their future payoff from 
borrowing money on the offered terms. For-profit education is a strong 
example of this problem. Even if low post-graduation employment numbers 
are reported accurately, optimistic students believe they will complete the 
program and be one of the lucky few to secure a high-paying job.43 More 
generally, it is often easy to believe that we will make more money in the 
future, that income will increase over time, and that job prospects will 
                                                                                                                     
39  If the economy experiences a downturn, mass defaults could keep these arrangements from being 
profitable for predatory lenders at all. Someone has to be able to pay them something.  
40 David M. Herszenhorn, Congress Approves $700 Billion Wall Street Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
3, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/worldbusiness/03iht-bailout.4.16679355.html. 
41 Often, in collective action situations, “the socially optimal outcome is not automatically 
achievable as the Nash equilibrium of the game.” AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF 
STRATEGY 356 (Ed Parsons ed., 1st ed. 1999). 
42 Michael S. Barr, Credit Where It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 513, 516 (2005). 
43 This miscalculation applies to more traditional, non-profit education as well where students pay 
large sums for programs that offer low probabilities of well-paying employment in the future. The New 
York Times has covered this phenomenon extensively. See, e.g., The Editorial Board, Keep For-Profit 
Schools on a Short Leash, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2017, at A22 (noting that for-profit schools must get ten 
percent of their revenue from somewhere other than federal loans, and part of this ten percent can be 
private loans). Some for-profit schools offer the loans themselves, but charge high fees and interest rates. 
Id. One of the most well-known examples is ITT Technical Institute, which was sued in 2015 for fraud. 
Id. See also Erica L. Green, For Students Swindled by Predatory Colleges, Relief May Only Be Partial, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2017, at A17 (discussing Corinthians College, which has a similar story to ITT 
Tech). The day before the Trump administration took office, the Obama administration approved $450 
million of full loan relief. Id. Now, under the Trump Department of Education spearheaded by Betsy 
DeVos, the students who expected the full relief may only receive partial loan relief. Id. 
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improve with more education and stability. Information asymmetries and 
optimism biases prevent many borrowers from accurately pricing a loan’s 
costs and benefits.44 Both default on the loan and the tremendous burden of 
trying to make payments on it can cause severe negative externalities, such 
as reliance on social welfare programs, decreased productivity, increased 
costs of credit for all borrowers, and in extreme cases, harm to the credit 
markets or the economy.45 
The regulatory reaction to these problems in the mortgage markets was 
to try address the information asymmetry without attempting to correct the 
optimism bias.46 Congress included regulation of the mortgage industry in 
the Dodd-Frank Act47 and created the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau.48 The goal of the regulatory response was to make credit safer for 
consumers.49 The Dodd-Frank Act, among other things, requires lenders to 
try to determine a borrower’s ability to repay mortgage loans.50 More 
broadly, the CFPB is responsible for ensuring that consumer financial 
products are safe for consumers by regulating against “unfair, deceptive, or 
abusive ads and practices.”51 The CFPB has broad authority to regulate 
consumer credit transactions and the sale or service of a variety of financial 
products.52  
Both regulatory regimes take steps to limit the kinds of loans available 
to consumers in the interest of providing only “safe” products to 
consumers.53 For instance, the Dodd-Frank Act requires mortgage lenders to 
determine before approving a loan that the borrower has the “ability to 
repay” loan at the time it is consummated.54 Lenders find a safe harbor from 
this requirement when they make what are known as “qualified” loans whose 
                                                                                                                     
44 Barr, supra note 42, at 534. 
45 See Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 749, 
781-89 (2008) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts]. 
46 Id. at 765–68. 
47 The Dodd-Frank Act’s contributions to mortgage regulation were enacted in various sections of 
the Truth in Lending Act, the Department of Housing and Urban Development Act, the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act of 1974, the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act 
of 1989, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act. Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 11-203, 124 Stat. § 1376 (2010). 
48 The CFPB was formed to protect consumers in financial transactions. Adam J. Levitin, The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 334–35 
(2013) [hereinafter, Levitin, The CFPB]. 
49 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 98 (proposing the agency that would become the CFPB, 
and that one of its authors would head, as a way to ensure the safety of financial products for consumers). 
50 124 Stat. § 1376. 
51 Levitin, The CFPB, supra note 48, at 337. 
52 Id. at 344–46. 
53 12 C.F.R. § 1008.1 (2018). 
54 The lender must make a good faith determination to this end by collecting and analyzing 
documents relating to the borrower’s financial condition and must consider the borrower’s ability to 
repay all aspects of the loan: taxes, fees, insurance on the home, as well as the principal and interest 
payments due for the life of the loan. 124 Stat. § 1376. 
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terms fall within specified parameters of affordability and predictability.55 
The safe harbor for qualified mortgages ensures that consumers can 
understand and afford the highest payments they will have to make during 
the life of the loan, that the term of the loan does not extend beyond thirty 
years, and that the accompanying interest rate “points” and other fees do not 
exceed a threshold level.56 With these restrictions in place, lenders are more 
likely to give prime loans (usually those accompanied by a twenty percent 
down payment, no or few points, and long term monthly payments that are 
safely within the borrower’s ability to repay) than sub-prime or “Alt-A” 
loans.57 
Rather than helping low-income, less-savvy consumers borrow more 
safely, the regulations seem to have prevented them from borrowing at all.58 
While discerning a consumer’s ability to repay debt is important, so is 
ensuring that the consumer understands the terms of a loan and the 
consequences of various payment scenarios. Imposing liability on lenders 
for taking risks on lower-income consumers means denying access to credit 
to those consumers, many of whom would be able to repay the loans if they 
were given the chance.59 Sensitivity to the fact that new regulations may chill 
lending too much and leave part of the population without meaningful access 
to credit has led the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the CFPB 
to ask lenders to devise innovative products that will allow lower income 
populations to have access to credit without imposing the widespread and 
                                                                                                                     
55 Id. § 1412. 
56 Id. 
57 “Alt-A” loans are “‘medium risk’ loans between subprime and prime” loans. Bar-Gill, supra note 
18, at 1089. 
58 See Patrick T. O’Keefe, Note, Qualified Mortgages & Government Reverse Redlining: How the 
CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage Regulations Will Handicap the Availability of Credit to Minority 
Borrowers, 21 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 413, 432 (2016) (discussing how minority borrowers with 
particular loan-to-debt ratios may become delinquent on their loans); Patrick Barnard, Hispanic Market 
Represents Huge Opportunity for Mortgage Lenders, MORTGAGEORB (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://mortgageorb.com/hispanic-market-represents-huge-opportunity-for-mortgage-lenders (“It has 
been estimated that more than 50 million creditworthy borrowers were shut out of the mortgage market 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis, mainly due to stricter underwriting standards resulting from 
increased regulation.”); Henry Grabar, The Rich are Getting More Mortgages. The Poor are Getting 
More Car Loans, SLATE: MONEYBOX (May 19, 2017, 4:51 PM) 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2017/05/19/the_rich_are_getting_more_mortgages_the_poor_ar
e_getting_more_car_loans.html (“[B]ecause expensive debt goes where it can, and has flowed into the 
auto loan business . . . from the more tightly regulated mortgage industry . . . . [m]ore than [sixty] percent 
of new home loans go to borrowers with super-high credit scores, a record since record-keeping began 
in 2003 and double what the share was then.”).. 
59 A borrower’s inability to satisfy the current debt-to-income ratio does not mean that the borrower 
will not be able to repay her mortgage. O’Keefe, supra note 58, at 432 (“When loan-to-value ratio, 
total loan amount, and a borrower's credit score are all considered during the underwriting process, 
borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between [forty-three and forty five percent] were only slightly 
more likely to become delinquent on loan payments than borrowers with a debt-to-income ratio between 
[thirty-six and forty percent].”). 
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systemic risks subprime loans did in the early 2000s.60 The balance is 
difficult to strike and the regulatory agencies seem to be interested in using 
market innovation to help reach it, recognizing that a balance, not just one-
sided prime lending, is an important goal.  
The goal seems to be to induce lenders to provide consumer-friendly 
loans. A consumer-friendly loan is one that a consumer is reasonably likely 
to be able to repay on time and without incurring penalty fees. Because 
individuals not only differ in their financial resources, but also their 
spending habits, the degree of financial assistance they receive from family 
and friends, and their future earning potential, discerning a consumer’s 
ability to pay is more of an art than a science. Some information, like 
contributions from family members toward a down payment, could and 
would be disclosed, but creditors have learned that even very risky loans are 
often repaid eventually and such loans are often very lucrative for lenders.61 
Borrowers also benefit from the access to credit provided by risky loans 
because it allows them to achieve a standard of living that may have 
otherwise been unavailable to them. Thus, it is not beneficial to either 
borrowers or lenders to limit mortgages to only “qualified” or “safe” 
mortgages. A “risky” loan may still be “consumer friendly.” Providing credit 
to low-income borrowers or those with low credit scores has always been a 
difficult proposition.62 The recent financial crisis is evidence that too many 
such loans can cause serious systemic problems. Still, a “consumer-friendly 
approach” balances access to credit and a responsible attitude toward 
repayment. 
The focus of the regulatory response on disclosure has been ineffective 
because the disclosures are too long and detailed for consumers to be able to 
read and understand and because the disclosure of mere terms of a loan, even 
if it is intelligible, does not overcome an optimism bias that may tempt 
borrowers to agree to loans they cannot repay. The understanding and 
accurate evaluation of the information is just as important as its receipt. In 
turn, understanding loan terms, interest rates, monthly payments, and fees is 
helpful, but it still does not overcome biases about how much a borrower 
will be able to afford over the life of the loan. Forcing lenders to explain to 
borrowers what lenders know about a particular borrower’s 
                                                                                                                     
60 CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, FAIR LENDING REPORT 24–26 (Apr. 2016), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201704_cfpb_Fair_Lending_Report.
pdf. 
61 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002). 
62 Christopher P. Guzelian, Michael Ashley Stein, & Hagop S. Akiskal, Credit Scores, Lending, 
and Psychosocial Disability, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1807, 1811-24 (2015) (discussing the multitude of barriers 
to receiving credit that low-income individuals face). 
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creditworthiness, as suggested by Bar-Gill, would address this problem.63 
Lenders are able to predict with some accuracy which borrowers will have 
to pay late fees and how often. They know which loans are most likely to 
default and when. This information is included in the interest rate, but often 
disguised or manipulated in adjustable rate loans or interest only loans or 
hidden in fees the borrower may be convinced she will not ever incur. 
Communicating to a borrower directly that a loan has an x percent chance 
of defaulting or that a loan is in the x percentile of the riskiest loans may 
make the point more plainly. 
This Article addresses the problem created by the regulatory response to 
the role subprime lending played in the financial crisis. Poor borrowers do 
not understand many of the mortgage terms they must choose among and do 
not understand how a given mortgage might affect them financially in the 
short or long term. Meanwhile, there is no one responsible for explaining 
mortgage terms and their consequences to these less sophisticated 
borrowers, and they are without representation in the most complex financial 
transactions of their lives. Because the problems created by lending to 
subprime borrowers are so systemically harmful, the response has largely 
been to simply stop lending to them.64  
Improving upon the system of intermediaries available to facilitate 
mortgage transactions will be an important step in making mortgage loans 
more widely available and more successful. Under-lending to subprime 
borrowers excludes a large portion of the population not only from the 
financial and emotional benefits of home ownership,65 but also from making 
valuable contributions to the economy. Banks and large lenders are 
concerned with systemic risk. They need to ensure only that their portfolio 
of loans does not fail; they are insensitive to the risks of any individual loan. 
Individual borrowers bear the greatest risk of loss if they default on their 
loans and are forced from their homes by foreclosure. Because the 
sophisticated parties making most of the decisions in the mortgage process 
do not bear much, or any, individual risk with the success or failure of 
individual loans, the borrowers who shoulder the bulk of the risk of loss are 
at a severe disadvantage. Paradoxically, they have the most to lose yet 
exercise the least control over the process. Further, consumers do not buy 
                                                                                                                     
63 Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 46, at 797–800 (pointing out that credit card issuers 
have information and models that will predict how a consumer will use the card and incur fees and 
suggesting that that information be shared with, or at least priced for, the consumer).  
64 The FHA still provides some refuge for those with poor credit and those who want to loan them 
money. It insures loans to people with low credit scores and/or those making small down payments, 
provided they show signs of financial responsibility such as having made timely payments on all of their 
obligations for a particular period of time. FHA Loan Requirements: Important FHA Guidelines for 
Borrowers, FHA.COM, http://www.fha.com/fha_loan_requirements (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).  
65 See William M. Rohe & Mark Lindblad, Reexamining the Social Benefits of Homeownership 
After the Housing Crisis, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES HARV. UNIV. 1, 21 (2013), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/jchs.harvard.edu/files/hbtl-04.pdf (citing studies finding that owning a 
home gives a people a sense of stability which reduces stress and helps them manage hardship). 
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homes often, so they are not able to realize the benefits of being repeat 
players in the mortgage market. While lenders are able to perfect their 
strategies over time and are able to develop relationships with real estate 
agents and others who may send borrowers their way, borrowers are not able 
to realize those advantages. Working toward developing an intermediary 
who can be a repeat player in service of borrowers may be valuable as long 
as that intermediary is prevented from being captured by lenders. A legal 
framework to support the use of BSIs can help to provide that protection.  
II. CHANGING THE WAY WE THINK ABOUT CONSUMER DEBT 
First, it will help to understand that mortgage borrowers are both buyers 
and sellers in a loan transaction and to appreciate the incentives the various 
parties to a mortgage transaction have. There are two ways to think of the 
relationship between mortgage borrowers and lenders. One view labels 
mortgage borrowers as issuers who are “selling” or “issuing” debt. This is 
the securities law paradigm.66 Borrowers are issuers or sellers, and lenders 
are investors, or buyers, of promissory notes. The other view, used by 
consumer law, labels mortgage borrowers as buyers who are purchasing 
mortgages, which are complex financial products.67 Lenders are selling 
mortgage products and borrowers are buying money at a price and under 
terms set by lenders.  
The difference is important because we usually think of sellers as having 
an informational advantage over buyers. We design disclosure rules and 
define representatives in response to a belief that buyers must be able to 
overcome some informational asymmetries with sellers. With regard to 
mortgage lending, both views are accurate. Both sides of the transaction 
require information from the other that the law would rather the parties not 
be able to conceal. Both are relatively vulnerable to sharp dealing by the 
other at various points in the transaction. A solution that appreciates and 
balances the two views is likely to lead to more efficient lending and 
borrowing than one that sees borrowers as only vulnerable or lenders as the 
only party requiring information to make an investment choice. 
Securities law views borrowers as sellers. When a party wants to raise 
money from the capital markets on credit, that party is considered the 
“issuer” of the debt security, and the lenders purchase the securities the 
issuer offers. Issuers are subject to significant and often expensive 
registration requirements, so it stands to reason that consumer notes are not 
                                                                                                                     
66 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 66–67 (1990) (explaining that a note will be considered 
a security if: (1) it has an investment purpose; (2) it is from a common trading investment; (3) the public 
expects the note to be a security; and (4) the Securities Acts are necessary to reduce the risk associated 
with the note). 
67 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing the uninformed yet rational consumer’s 
understanding of sellers). 
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considered securities. It would be impractical to consider consumer 
borrowers “issuers” for the purposes of the notes they “sell” to lenders.68 
The liability that attaches to the issuer of a security would be prohibitive for 
most consumers. For this reason, commercial law and consumer protection 
law govern consumer loans while securities law only regulates loans made 
to businesses for investment purposes.69 
For the most part, commercial law does an adequate job of regulating 
the rights and responsibilities of consumer borrowers and lenders once they 
have entered a lending relationship. It also governs lending transactions 
between banks and businesses, focusing most of its regulatory effort on 
payment methods and the use of security for loans.70 Bankruptcy law 
supplements the commercial law governing debtors and creditors by 
determining a borrower’s rights vis-à-vis its creditors and creditors’ rights 
vis-à-vis other creditors when a borrower cannot pay all creditors as 
agreed.71  
But there is a gap in helping the vulnerable buyer navigate the 
negotiation of the terms of the complex financial product. The commercial 
law, focused on lending transactions, does not respond particularly well to 
problems with negotiating loans, either with regard to the terms that apply 
to the loan or ways to ensure an unsophisticated consumer’s understanding 
of those terms. These issues are mostly addressed through special regulation 
relating to consumer loans, such as the Truth in Lending Act.72 The common 
law of contract can respond to some of the problems posed by negotiation 
between parties of vastly different sophistication by refusing to enforce loan 
agreements that involve fraud, misrepresentation, or unconscionability.73 
But as more loans and other kinds of contracts become more standardized 
and consumers become more accustomed to ignoring boilerplate terms, 
traditional contract law is less effective at protecting consumer borrowers 
from sophisticated lenders. Attempts to specifically regulate disclosure of 
contract terms and loan terms to consumers have succeeded mostly in 
making disclosures longer, thereby making consumers feel more 
                                                                                                                     
68 See Reves, 494 U.S. at 66 (“If the note is exchanged to facilitate the purchase and sale of a minor 
asset or consumer good, to correct for the seller’s cash-flow difficulties, or to advance some other 
commercial or consumer purpose . . . the note is less sensibly described as a ‘security.’”); United Housing 
Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 850–51 (1975) (finding a share of stock carrying a right to 
subsidized housing was not a security because “the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire 
subsidized low-cost living space” and not to invest for profit). 
69 Reves, 494 U.S. at 67. 
70 Id. 
71 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 28, at 74 (discussing how consumers can be protected by 
contract law and bankruptcy law).  
72 Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667. 
73 Nolo, What Makes a Contract Valid?, FORBES (Nov. 20, 2006, 2:46 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2006/11/20/smallbusiness-statelaw-gifts-ent-law-
cx_nl_1120contracts.html#2f03146e6aff. 
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comfortable and protected, whether or not they actually are.74 Some 
regulations have specifically addressed permissible terms of certain kinds of 
loans—notably mortgage loans—but fall short of encouraging market 
conditions that can lead to the creation of innovative loan products that allow 
low-income borrowers safe and responsible access to credit. Despite 
regulations designed to protect them, unsophisticated, inexperienced 
borrowers are either shut out of large consumer loans or have significant 
difficulty understanding the risks associated with the decisions they have to 
make in choosing the right loan terms. 
Because of the different paradigms we’ve used for thinking about 
securities law and large-scale consumer lending, the two bodies of law have 
been hesitant to draw from one another. Borrowing consumer law’s view of 
borrowers as buyers will allow us to apply lessons from securities law to the 
similar situation presented by the current mortgage lending environment. In 
mortgage markets, just as in securities markets, unsophisticated consumers 
are buying a complex financial product. The securities law has focused on 
creating conditions that protect unsophisticated investors from being taken 
advantage of at the hands of more sophisticated “sellers.”75 For example, the 
securities laws and the market conditions upon which they rely interpose 
learned intermediaries for securities offerings to individual investors and 
between issuers and individual investors on the secondary market. In the 
primary market, where securities are initially offered to investors, the issuer 
must either file a registration statement with the SEC before offering the 
securities to the public,76 or demonstrate that the securities are being offered 
privately to a few sophisticated investors—or, in some cases—investors 
with a sophisticated representative.77 Further, the extensive disclosure 
system mandated by securities regulation assumes that sophisticated 
intermediaries, usually analysts and institutional investors, read and digest 
the complex disclosures issuers make. Individual investors are not expected 
to read and understand these disclosures themselves, but are deemed 
protected by them because they are trading in a market informed by 
professional analysis of that detailed information. The consumer finance 
market mandates disclosure and tries to regulate what kinds of consumers 
                                                                                                                     
74 See BEN-SHAHAR AND SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE 666–67 (2014) (finding that mandated disclosure rarely works, as most people 
assume that they can safely ignore most disclosures and lack the literacy to analyze them anyway); see 
also Angela A. Hung et al., Final Report, Effective Disclosures in Financial Decisionmaking, RAND 
CORP. 13–14 (2015), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1270.html (noting that disclosure 
used in isolation may not provide investors with enough support to make informed decisions). 
75 C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities Laws, 6 DUKE L.J. 
1081, 1083 (1988). 
76 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). 
77 See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2015) (noting that § 77e does not apply to transactions which do not 
“involv[e] any public offering.”). 
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can be given access to which products, but fails to rely on or even suggest 
sophisticated intermediaries who can make investment judgments for 
inexperienced consumer borrowers. None of this is to say that securities 
intermediaries are perfect, only that some of them have helpfully focused on 
compensating for investors’ lack of understanding of complicated 
disclosures. Consumer finance intermediaries have not yet evolved to serve 
the same purpose. 
Mortgage borrowers have a collective interest and a collective action 
problem just as securities holders do.78 The mortgage products banks made 
available to them are designed to appeal to a large number of borrowers. 
Each product, or set of mortgage terms, is designed for borrowers with 
particular characteristics, but may also be sold to borrowers in varying 
financial circumstances depending on the judgment of individual mortgage 
lenders. Securities investors are a similarly diverse group facing decisions 
about buying expensive, complex financial products. The securities 
regulations have sought to protect investors based on their common 
vulnerabilities while leaving room for markets to discover the best precise 
terms upon which investors can purchase securities. 
The complete picture of modern mortgage investment is more complex 
than identifying the one seller and one buyer of a financial product. 
Borrowers are also issuers and public investors are still buyers of debt. 
Because mortgages are securitized, there is a traditional securities 
transaction after the mortgage product is sold to the borrower. A mortgage 
lender, typically a national bank,79 securitizes a group of mortgages and sells 
interests in the income stream from a group of mortgages to securities 
investors.80 Investment banks may also purchase and securitize mortgages, 
underwriting their own issuance of mortgage securities.81  
There is some concern that agency costs affect the interactions between 
the mortgage originators and the ultimate purchasers of mortgage-backed 
securities.82 Because they are planning to immediately sell the mortgages 
they negotiate with borrowers, mortgage originators may be less concerned 
about a given borrower’s ability to repay. Indeed, many blame this state of 
affairs for the housing market bubble in the 2000s.83 Some Dodd-Frank 
                                                                                                                     
78 See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for 
Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 278–79 (2003) (“Dispersed shareholders unable to act 
collectively allow opportunistic managers to expropriate large private benefits of control. Any single 
shareholder who expends additional resources in monitoring management or coordinating with other 
shareholders to change management will typically bear the costs alone . . . .”). 
79 Either the original lender or a bank that buys mortgages from originators can serve this purpose. 
80 Victoria V. Corder, Homeowners and Bondholders as Unlikely Allies: Allocating the Costs of 
Securitization in Foreclosure, 30 NO. 5 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP. 19, 20 (2011).  
81 Id.  
82 See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 20, at 8 (noting the inherent agency problem within the growth 
of consumer debt securitization). 
83 Adam J. Levitin et al., supra note 13, at 157. 
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regulations, such as those requiring that originators keep some “skin in the 
game” seek to alleviate that difficulty,84 but commentators worry that those 
regulations are not enough.85 Agency costs between the loan originator and 
the ultimate MBS investors mean the investors may be buying riskier 
products than they would otherwise, and because they cannot see the details 
about all of the borrowers who are obligated on the mortgages making up 
the security’s income stream, they are riskier products than they realize. This 
second information problem, in addition to the agency problem, persists 
even after Dodd-Frank and may discourage private investment in the credit 
risk associated with mortgage loans.86 
The models that have emphasized the agency problem in the mortgage-
lending context have described the mortgage originators as the agents and 
the investors in mortgage-backed securities as the principals.87 This is so 
even though these “agents” are sellers vis-à-vis MBS investors just as they 
are “sellers” of mortgage products to borrowers. Given the structure of the 
transaction, there is very little reason to think the mortgage originators are 
any more the agents of MBS investors than they are agents of borrowers. In 
both situations, the originator is selling a complex financial product to a 
buyer who does not have as much information about the product or the likely 
outcome of the transaction as the originator does. In both situations, the 
originator has an important informational advantage both with regard to the 
particular transaction, but also with regard to the market in similar 
transactions overall. Again, our traditional understanding of debt 
relationships stands in the way of seeing the relationships as similarly 
situated and applying similar principals to resolving their similar problems.  
Creditors are not agents of borrowers, nor should they be. Creditors 
make decisions about whether to lend money and how much to lend based 
on their own financial interests. The fact that there is or could be a conflict 
of interest between the borrower’s interests (in obtaining a loan) and the 
creditor’s interests (in being repaid) is obvious to all involved. In the 
                                                                                                                     
84 Id. at 158.  
85 See generally id. (arguing that Dodd-Frank reforms that serve as “skin-in-the-game” credit-risk 
retention fail to solve the informational problems in the housing market). Specifically, the proposed 
bonding function where banks retain credit risk on securitized assets is likely insufficient because 
“investors cannot determine where a bank is competent at evaluating the risk on mortgages.” Id. at 162. 
Therefore, Dodd-Frank is merely “replac[ing] one informational problem—that of securitization—with 
another—that of financial conglomerates.” Id. Further, providing investors with large amounts of loan-
level data will have limited benefit “absent proven credit risk models that can make sense of the 
relationships between the different variables disclosed.” Id. at 173.  
86 Id. at 159–60. Credit risk, they say, is made up of both the risk of default and the risk associated 
with the severity of loss upon default. Id. at 157. Interest rate risk, on the other hand, is simply the risk 
assumed by all lenders that market interest rates will go down. Id. at 169. At the moment, the government 
takes on almost all credit risk associated with mortgages, while private investors stick to interest rate risk. 
See id. at 156–57. 
  87 Id. at 226.  
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mortgage market, the original lender’s lack of skin in the game creates a 
conflict of interest with both the borrower and the ultimate purchaser of the 
loan or the investor in an MBS containing the loan. That conflict is less 
obvious to the borrower. Lenders who are going to sell the loan to a third 
party have incentives to make riskier loans and so are not necessarily 
protecting their interest in being repaid. The Dodd-Frank Act tries to 
mitigate that problem by emphasizing the ability to repay in loan origination 
and by imposing “skin in the game” requirements for mortgage originators, 
but the fact remains that a securitization lending model complicates the 
mortgage originator’s incentives beyond a borrower’s assumptions or even 
understanding.88 While not justifying anything like a fiduciary duty, the fact 
that borrowers cannot see or anticipate a given originator’s incentives in 
making a loan means that the borrower lacks an important understanding of 
what the approval of a loan means and how the borrower should decide 
which loan product makes the most sense for her. 
Before thinking through the design of a BSI that could better guide 
buyers through the mortgage process while also expanding access to credit 
and preventing large-scale foreclosures, we should first consider other uses 
of intermediaries in similar circumstances. Understanding the legal and 
regulatory pitfalls those intermediary systems encountered will help us to 
avoid those mistakes in the future. 
III. THE TROUBLE WITH INTERMEDIARIES 
Intermediaries abound. Salespeople and retailers of all stripes help 
consumers purchase products from manufacturers. Various brokers and 
agents facilitate more complex transactions. Lawyers and courts serve as 
intermediaries between citizens and the civil and criminal justice systems.  
As noted above, Kathryn Judge has written about the lobbying power of 
intermediaries and how they can use their political and market influence to 
entrench high fees, even as those fees are inefficient and corrupt their 
incentives.89 Of particular note for our purposes is the confusion around real 
estate agents. While Judge focused on fees, we will turn our attention to the 
buyer’s understanding of the homebuying experience and to how courts have 
responded to a tangle of state regulations to try to honor the expectations and 
protect the vulnerabilities of buyers. This Part will also look at the mortgage 
broker, a position that was designed to represent buyers in the mortgage 
borrowing process, helping them select a loan and complete the application. 
Finally, it will consider the work of securities underwriters, largely for the 
purpose of borrowing from the dual roles underwriters play to inform the 
design of a potential BSI later in the Article. Securities regulations are very 
                                                                                                                     
88 Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 143, 161 (2009).  
89 Judge, supra note 3, at 641. 
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different from the market solutions to the mortgage borrower’s difficulties 
this Article is most concerned with. But studying the design of the 
underwriting process and how the expectations of underwriters are managed 
can be helpful to thinking about how to design intermediaries in similar 
situations. 
A. Real Estate Agents 
Most people are mistaken about how real estate agency works.90 There 
is a widespread assumption, even among real estate agents, that the selling 
agent—that is, the agent that shows the buyer the house and submits the 
buyer’s bid—represents the buyer.91 Traditionally, the listing agent is an 
agent of the seller and the selling agent is a subagent of the seller.92 Many 
states realized that this arrangement left the buyer unrepresented and both 
the buyer and selling agent confused.93 Buyers would often tell selling agents 
the most they were willing to pay for the house and the selling agents, 
contrary to their duty to the seller, would not pass that information on to the 
seller.94 The truth of the arrangement left buyers completely unrepresented, 
often without their knowledge, because all agents were supposed to be 
cooperating to sell the house for the seller. This cooperation among agents 
seemed necessary to allow agents to openly share information about 
listings.95 Another justification for the arrangement is the notion that the 
seller pays the agents’ commissions out of the sales proceeds. Of course, 
sellers demand more money from buyers in the first place because they 
factor in the costs of real estate commissions. To say that only the seller pays 
the commissions does not quite tell the whole story. Granted, the buyer is 
only willing to pay so much, and once the seller finds the most the market 
seems to be willing to pay for her house, real estate commissions must be 
paid out of that total. But it seems obvious that if real estate agents did not 
exist, housing prices would be noticeably lower.96 Buyers therefore incur 
some of the cost of real estate commissions. And yet, they are not necessarily 
                                                                                                                     
90 See Barondes & Slawson, supra note 4, at 682 (noting that common assumptions about real estate 
agents may be erroneous). 
91 Id.; Paula C. Murray, The Real Estate Broker and the Buyer: Negligence and the Duty to 
Investigate, 32 VILL. L. REV. 939, 949–50 (1987); Olazábal, supra note 5, at 72–73. 
92 Murray, supra note 91, at 939–40; Olazábal, supra note 5, at 72–73. 
93 Barondes & Slawson, supra note 4, at 683–84. 
94 Id. at 694. 
95 The advent of the Multiple Listing Service, a subscription-based service where all homes listed 
by realtors were collected and shared with all other licensed realtors, gave rise to the subagency 
arrangement. See Olazábal, supra note 5, at 73–76 (describing the role of MLS in mandating the 
subagency structure). The National Association of Realtors “agreed to eliminate seller-subagency as a 
condition of participation in a regional or local multiple listing service” in 1992. Id. at 74–75; Matthew 
Collette, Sub-Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: A Proposal to End the Struggle with Reality, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 406–08 (1988). 
96 Judge, supra note 3, at 585–86. 
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represented by anyone in the transaction.  
Recognizing that buyers are at a disadvantage both in their lack of 
representation and in their informational disadvantage vis-à-vis the seller, 
states have regulated home buying. Many regulations focus on mandating 
disclosure about the homes to be sold. Sellers simply must disclose and 
warrant the condition of certain elements of the home they are selling.97 
Regulation has also addressed the lack of buyer representation. States have 
taken different approaches, all aimed at allowing some kind of direct 
representation of, or help for, buyers in varying degrees.98 Some can fully 
act as buyers’ agents, while others may only perform ministerial acts such 
as submitting bids or making appointments.99 Some states have given up on 
direct fiduciary representation of buyers and sellers entirely, designating real 
estate agents as “transaction brokers” who are beholden to the transaction 
itself, rather than to representing either party.100 
These regulatory responses try to solve the problem of how to provide 
representation for both sides of a transaction where both parties are 
unsophisticated, and where the same agents or agency may be doing the 
work on both sides. The newer, specific regulations have failed to resolve 
the confusion about who represents whom because the regulations vary by 
jurisdiction and seem to complicate technicalities rather than resolve more 
fundamental questions of who truly represents the interests of [and helps] 
each party.101 Only regimes that provide for separate agents for buyers and 
sellers with clearly disclosed roles can overcome confusion about what the 
role of a real estate agent is. Anything short of designating a separate agent 
to represent each party in a transaction is bound to result in confusion and 
some disloyalty to—or mistreatment of—one side of the transaction or the 
other. 
Courts have been able to provide remedies for buyers, state regulation 
and industry practices notwithstanding. Some have found a fiduciary 
relationship even when the broker and buyer did not specifically enter into 
an agency relationship.102 Others have done so by imposing obligations on 
agents to be “honest,” “fair[],” and “ethical” in dealings with buyers even 
where no agency relationship was established. These requirements were 
                                                                                                                     
97 Murray, supra note 91, at 946; George Lefcoe, Property Condition Disclosure Forms: How the 
Real Estate Industry Eased the Transition from Caveat Emptor to Seller Tell All, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 193, 198–99 (2004). 
98 Olazábal, supra note 5, at 75–76. 
99 Id. at 76–79, 86. 
100 Id. at 87–88. 
101 Id. at 130–31. The entire article is a critique of specific state regulatory attempts to solve the 
problems caused by the seller subagency system. Olazábal stresses that the regulatory response may have 
solved individual, particular problems, but may not have considered the big picture and may therefore 
have left unfortunate consequences of the operation of the real estate agent law and practice unremedied. 
102 Murray, supra note 91, at 957 (citing Harper v. Adametz, 113 A.2d 136, 189 (Conn. 1955)). 
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based on a “public interest” theory—that real estate agents and brokers owe 
duties to the community to behave in an ethical manner that does not harm 
the buyer by, for example, not communicating a buyer’s bid to the seller or 
by misleading the buyer in fraudulent ways.103 Still others have provided 
remedies to buyers for a failure of a broker to disclose key information about 
a property, relying on theories of misrepresentation.104 Despite formal 
practices and the definitions of agent loyalties provided by statute, courts 
have still been willing to find remedies for buyers who have been treated 
poorly in their interaction with real estate agents who purport to work for 
sellers. The courts have been able to, on an equitable basis, provide a remedy 
where regulation failed to even provide clarity. 
The fact of the matter is that real estate agents are most loyal to the 
transaction. That is, they want the deal to close.105 They want houses to sell. 
More sales mean more commissions. High prices are nice, but higher volume 
is nicer.106 This tendency by real estate agents harms sellers in that it 
prevents them from getting as high of a price for their home as they might 
be able to obtain if they waited longer.107 It harms buyers to the extent agents 
may encourage buyers to buy any home quickly rather than waiting for the 
right home at the right price to come on the market. Representing her own 
interests, a real estate agent imposes agency costs on the transaction and does 
not have incentives to learn and pursue the best interests of either party. 
Pushing everyone to say “yes” can be detrimental when “yes” is the wrong 
answer for one or both sides of the transaction. When thinking about the 
optimal characteristics of a true buyers’ side intermediary, it will be 
important to design incentives that are not tied to closing just any deal. But 
first, we turn to another intermediary in the home buying process: the 
mortgage broker. 
B. Mortgage Brokers 
Mortgage brokers are only used in about twelve percent of mortgage 
transactions.108 This is in contrast to mortgage brokers’ participation in the 
                                                                                                                     
103 Id. at 960–63. 
104 Id. at 964–84; see also Lefcoe, supra note 97, at 199 (describing common law remedies available 
to homeowners when sellers fail to disclose “known material latent defects (as defined by courts over 
time) not readily observable to buyers”). 
105 Steven D. Levitt & Chat Syverson, Market Distortions When Agents Are Better Informed: The 
Value of Information in Real Estate Transactions, 90 REV. ECON. & STAT. 599, 599 (2008) (noting that 
real estate agents have strong incentives to sell houses quickly). 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 599–600. 
108 Lenders 101, DOORSTEPS, https://www.doorstepsbuy.com/learn-more/2/lenders-101 (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2018). 
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majority of mortgage loans in 2002.109 They have fallen out of favor with 
both lenders and borrowers. They once held the promise of being BSIs, 
learning about a borrower’s credit qualifications and budget, then choosing 
from a large portfolio of loan options to find the right one for each specific 
borrower.110 Because they had access to a variety of loans, brokers could 
often find more or better options for lower-income borrowers.111 As is often 
the case, the problem with mortgage brokers and their incentives arose from 
how they were paid.  
Mortgage brokers are often paid with origination fees, which are paid in 
cash by the borrower at closing.112 In order to allow borrowers to pay the 
mortgage broker’s fee over the life of the loan with their regular monthly 
mortgage payments, mortgage brokers used to be paid by yield spread 
premiums. A yield spread premium is in addition to the interest rate a 
borrower pays on a loan.113 The mortgage broker is paid from the 
premium.114 This form of payment allowed mortgage brokers to disguise 
their fee from borrowers and to receive more than they would have by simply 
charging an origination fee.115 It also gave mortgage brokers incentives to 
stick borrowers, particularly riskier borrowers, with much higher interest 
rates than they would otherwise have to pay. They could tell borrowers that 
the excess interest was in their best interest because it lowered the amount 
of cash due at closing, which was an appealing option to lower-income 
borrowers. Some brokers collected cash from borrowers and yield spread 
premiums from lenders. It was not necessarily made clear to borrowers how 
much they were paying and why.116 
The Dodd-Frank Act banned yield spread premiums.117 Now, mortgage 
brokers can be paid with lender credits, which function slightly differently. 
Mortgage brokers may still add to the loans’ interest rate, and they receive a 
                                                                                                                     
109 Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The Case of Yield Spread 
Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 290–91 (2007) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN 
DEV. OFF. POL’Y DEV. & RES., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS 
FOR RESPA PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING MORTGAGES TO 
REDUCE SETTLEMENT COSTS TO CONSUMERS 12 (2002)).  
110 See id. at 291 (describing the wide range of services provided by most mortgage brokers to assist 
borrowers with selecting the appropriate loan products). 
111 See id. (describing the lender and customer relationships of the average mortgage broker, which 
typically reviews the offerings of at least a dozen lenders and makes recommendations that are usually 
accepted by the customer). 
112 Id. at 289–90. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 291–92. 
115 Id. at 295–96 (reporting that mortgage brokers were paid significantly more—sometimes two or 
three times as much—when paid via yield spread premium rather than in cash with an origination fee). 
116 Id. 
117 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1) (2018) (“[N]o mortgage originator shall receive from any person and 
no person shall pay to a mortgage originator, directly or indirectly, compensation that varies based on 
the terms of the loan (other than the amount of the principal).”). 
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commission from lenders, but they cannot collect both a lender credit and an 
origination fee from the borrower, and they must disclose the lender credit 
clearly to the borrower.118  
Unfortunately, the new lender credit regime still does not solve the 
problem that mortgage brokers are paid by lenders nor does it address the 
conflict of interest inherent in the fact that mortgage brokers are bound to 
have closer relationships with lenders than with borrowers because they 
have repeated interactions with lenders. Further, the fact that mortgage 
brokers are paid as a percentage of the loan value encourages them to 
approve loans for higher principal amounts, regardless of the borrower’s 
budget.119 The ability to just add to the interest rate and amortize the loan 
over decades means that large differences in costs are made more palatable 
to borrowers. None of this is necessarily illegal, nor should it be, provided 
there is sufficiently clear disclosure. But it is not necessarily considerate of 
the borrower’s best interests, and mortgage brokers retain some perverse 
incentives even after the Dodd-Frank Act’s intervention. 
C. Securities Underwriters 
Understanding that securities investors and mortgage loan applicants are 
buyers of important, expensive financial investments120 allows us to draw 
useful comparisons to securities offerings. There, the intermediary of 
interest is the underwriter. Underwriters negotiate with issuers on behalf of 
securities investors to investigate the issuer and the proposed offering, to 
price the offering and negotiate its terms, and to bring the security to the 
public market.121 The price of the security depends not only on the value of 
the company’s equity or the strength of its borrowing position, but also on 
any other advantages securities holders may have. For instance, bondholders 
may benefit from any collateral that secures the loan or the seniority of the 
position of their tranche of debt, or particular covenants that give the 
bondholders rights against the firm or its management in times of financial 
distress. Preferred shareholders may benefit from special rights to dividend 
payments, the ability to convert their shares to common stock, or voting 
rights. The underwriter’s goal is to negotiate a security at a price and with 
                                                                                                                     
118 Id. 
119 Indeed, some lenders have vowed to stop accepting loans originated by mortgage brokers 
because they find that lender-originated loans are less likely to default. Marcie Geffner, Banks Cut Off 
Mortgage Brokers, BANKRATE (Apr. 2, 2009), https://www.bankrate.com/finance/mortgages/banks-cut-
off-mortgage-brokers-1.aspx. 
120 See supra Part III. 
121 There are a variety of different underwriting relationships available. Most common is the “firm 
commitment” arrangement under which the underwriter agrees to buy the entire issuance of securities 
from the issuer and then sell those securities to the market. John S. D’Alimonte, The Letter of Intent and 
Basic Structure of an Offering, in SECURITIES UNDERWRITING: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 94 (Kenneth 
J. Bialkin & William J. Grant, Jr. eds., 1985). 
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terms that will be marketable to the public.122 If the terms the underwriters 
negotiate for the security are not appealing to investors, the underwriters will 
not be able to unload their shares and will lose money and significant 
investments of time.  
Like listing agents, underwriters are retained and paid by issuers,123 so 
they have incentives to work on an issuer’s behalf to price and deliver 
securities to the market at a price that will support liquidity in the firm’s 
securities. Unlike real estate agents, underwriters generally guarantee the 
IPO price of a stock by purchasing the stock themselves to maintain the 
initial offering price.124 The issuer’s and underwriter’s interests are aligned 
in wanting to offer securities, a species of financial product, to the public on 
terms that will be desirable to investors. However, allegiance to the issuer 
also presents opportunities for capture of an underwriter by the issuer.125 Not 
only does the issuer select and pay the underwriter, but the issuer may also 
use other segments of the underwriter’s business. For instance, an 
investment bank that serves as an underwriter may have a retail investing 
division that operates mutual funds which the issuer could use for retirement 
plans.126 The underwriter may also be so hungry for underwriting business 
that it is willing to give the issuer a break in order to keep the engagement.127 
Before the enactment of the Volcker Rule,128 which bars proprietary trading 
                                                                                                                     
122 Wendy Gerwick Couture, Price Fraud, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 21–24 (2011); see also Arthur B. 
Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 119, 132–33 (2006) (describing 
the role of the underwriter in advising the issuer on steps it can take to make its securities offer “more 
attractive” to buyers). 
123 The issuer initiates the process by engaging the underwriter to promote the distribution of 
securities. This conversation typically predates the securities offering, with the managing underwriter 
acting as an advisor on many issues pertinent to the offering. The underwriter acts in something of a 
fiduciary capacity with the issuer but also may have a direct or indirect financial interest in the offering 
because its fee is tied to the success of the offering at hand and the performance of each offering affects 
opportunities with future issuers. Laby, supra note 122, at 132–33. 
124 See Joe Nocera, Facebook’s Brilliant Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/26/opinion/nocera-facebooks-brilliant-disaster.html?_r=0 (using the 
Facebook public offering to explain IPOs). 
125 Royce de R. Barondes, NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest – Does Gatekeeping 
Work?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 859, 869–71 (2005); see also Laby, supra note 122, at 133–34 (“[U]nderwriters 
continue to have an interest in cultivating the client relationship to obtain additional consulting and other 
work.”); Jeremy McClane, The Agency Costs of Teamwork, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1229, 1238 (2016) 
(comparing prices of an IPO when issuer’s counsel has worked with the underwriter in the past to when 
they have not worked together). 
126 See Barondes, supra note 125, at 870. 
127 See Laby, supra note 122, at 133–34. 
128 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012). The rule was enacted as part of Dodd-Frank to prevent banks from 
making certain speculative investments to the detriment of their customers. Five agencies jointly issued 
final regulations implementing the Volcker Rule. See Keith R. Fisher, Volcker Rule Agencies Issue 
Interim Final Rule Exempting TruPS-Backed CDOs, 67 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 337 (2013) (listing 
those agencies that were involved with the promulgation of the Volcker Rule and their goals). In part, 
the rule prohibits the activities of banking entities that “would involve or result in a material conflict of 
interest” between the entities and their clients or customers. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(2)(A)(i) (2012). 
 
 2019] MARKET-BASED INNOVATION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION 183 
by underwriters that would directly conflict with underwriting business, an 
underwriter may have had an independent equity stake in the issuer for 
whom it was underwriting an offering of more equity securities.129  
Underwriters are notorious for over or underpricing securities.130 
Underpricing a security allows the underwriter’s insiders to make a quick 
profit by trading IPO shares on the open market early in trading.131 
Overpricing shares may be an attempt to capture a larger fee than an offering 
warrants and disserves early investors in the issuance. The cost of 
overpricing is borne directly by investors with no benefit to the issuer. An 
underwriter’s various interests may compromise its ability to serve as an 
effective gatekeeper. Attempts to discipline underwriters through 
regulations provide more examples of specific regulation having limited 
utility and the failure of regulations focused on disclosure to control 
behavior or incentives. 
Intermediaries can add value by offering the benefit of their reputations 
to the parties they connect. Issuers can realize important benefits from the 
value of an underwriter’s reputation among investors.132 If investors can 
generally trust that a given underwriter has negotiated a fair deal for 
investors at an appropriate price, they will be more willing to purchase the 
security, and secondary market trading of the security will take off with the 
IPO price as a starting point. The success of prior offerings helps issuers 
when they return to the capital markets for funding in the future.133 When 
issuers are able to offer reliably liquid markets in their securities, investors 
are more likely to want to purchase them. Retaining a well-regarded 
underwriter to sign on to an offering is an important part of securing public 
financing.134  
While reputation is important to the value of a securities underwriter, 
reputations take time to build and have proven again and again to be an 
insufficient guard against opportunism by intermediaries. Many of the 
players responsible for the spate of financial fraud in the early aughts—such 
                                                                                                                     
129 Laby, supra note 122, at 133. 
130 Christine Hurt, Initial Public Offerings and the Failed Promise of Disintermediation, 2 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 703, 725 (2008) (“[A]n agency cost hypothesis explains in the simplest 
terms why an underwriter would underprice IPO shares. In doing so, the underwriter rewards loyal 
customers, including institutional investors and investment banking clients . . . .”). 
131 Id. at 723–24.  
132 Paul Schultz & Mir Zaman, Do the Individuals Closest to Internet Firms Believe They Are 
Overvalued?, 59 J. FIN. ECON. 347, 369 (2001) (“Underwriters, like venture capitalists, return to the 
initial public offering market repeatedly. Their desire to protect their reputation provides an incentive to 
avoid selling overpriced IPOs.”). 
133 Laby, supra note 122, at 133. 
134 Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 365, 386 (2012) (“In metaphorical terms, underwriters are regarded as renting their reputations 
to corporations, a function that economizes on information costs and creates value for the issuing 
corporations.”). 
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as rating agencies, securities analysts, and auditors—were supposed to rely 
on their reputations to maintain credibility and stay employed.135 The risk of 
losing their good reputations did not keep them from engaging in massive 
fraud or misrepresentation.136 So, while a valuable check, reputation alone 
is not enough to prevent capture by an intermediary and is certainly not 
enough to ensure that intermediary’s competence. Part VI will suggest other 
legal mechanisms for preventing capture of BSIs by lenders and ensuring 
that BSIs do not defraud lenders in their eagerness to extend credit to new 
borrowers.  
As all intermediaries do, underwriters impose agency costs on the 
securities offering process. Market forces, such as the effect of an 
underwriter’s reputation on the success of an offering, can help lower agency 
costs, but do not eliminate them. The dual role the underwriter serves and its 
vulnerability to capture by issuers makes it difficult to monitor the 
underwriter’s behavior and to figure out whether the underwriter is over-
pricing or underpricing securities for self-interested reasons. 
IV. MARKET ADVANCES 
Markets often create new intermediaries as they grow. New start-up 
firms devise better ways to bring transacting parties together and to represent 
the interests of each. There are firms in the consumer finance market, 
including the firms described below, that are well-positioned to help home 
buyers in various stages of the process, particularly in deciding how much 
money to borrow and on what terms. No firm has become a pure BSI, 
however.  
A BSI could solve the primary problems this Article has identified with 
the mortgage lending process. A BSI could help borrowers understand the 
terms of their loans and the short and long-term consequences of the 
mortgage terms to which they agree. It could also expand access to credit 
among lower-income markets by finding good credit risks among the 
borrowers currently shut out of mortgage borrowing. The presence of BSIs 
could improve borrower representation as they convince lenders to simplify 
loan terms and lower the costs of identifying worthy borrowers by applying 
improved techniques for evaluating creditworthiness. All of these worthy 
goals are in reach, as demonstrated by the work of the firms considered in 
this Part of the Article.  
This Part of the Article explores developments fintech firms have made 
in helping consumers borrow money and buy homes. It considers what their 
work tells us about the existence of a market for these kinds of services and 
the gaps the market seems ready to fill with innovative business practices. 
                                                                                                                     
135 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 353 
(2006). 
136 Id. 
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These new firms, or old firms growing into new areas, show potential for 
disrupting a field long dominated by tradition and strict regulation. 
A. Peer-to-Peer Lending—A False Start 
One consequence of the 2008 financial crisis was a steep decline in the 
availability of credit to individuals and businesses of all kinds and at all 
levels of wealth. Banks were not making loans, and when they did, they were 
not taking chances. As the sharing economy was gaining steam connecting 
those willing to help with consumers needing assistance, a similar practice 
took hold in financial services. Fintech firms tried to connect individual 
borrowers, seeking small loans for consumer purposes, with individuals 
willing to loan money to borrowers about whom they could learn via the 
lending platform.137 This arrangement is known as “peer-to-peer” (“P2P”) 
lending. Its goal is to serve “moneyball borrowers,”138 that is, borrowers who 
may not have the hallmarks of prime borrowers, but who would be good 
credit risks anyway. P2P lending platforms could allow lenders to make a 
different kind of investment—to realize a return on loans usually only 
available to banks—while at the same time providing a way for borrowers 
with weaker credit profiles to access capital. There was money to be made 
and help to be found in the business the banks were refusing. 
When consumers had trouble putting together enough of a credit line 
from a credit card or had trouble borrowing enough money from a bank on 
an unsecured basis, they turned to P2P loans. Most P2P loans were relatively 
small. A borrower may have wanted a loan to buy a car or to refinance credit 
card debt on more favorable terms. Early P2P loans were as small as 
hundreds of dollars and involved a high degree of contact between borrower 
and lender.139 Individual borrowers would post their request for a loan online 
along with personal details about themselves and what they wanted to use 
the money for.140 Lenders could “shop” among borrowers and select a 
borrower who wanted a loan of the appropriate size and whose story 
resonated with the lender.141 Compared to banks, lenders in a P2P were more 
                                                                                                                     
137 Kathryn Judge, The Future of Direct Finance: The Diverging Paths of Peer-to-Peer Lending 
and Kickstarter, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 603, 604 (2015). 
138 The term “moneyball” was famously coined by Michael Lewis in his book, Moneyball: The Art 
of Winning an Unfair Game, about Billy Beane’s innovations as the Oakland Athletics’ general manager. 
Beane focused on statistics to find underappreciated baseball players who were overlooked by scouts but 
would play well as a team. MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME 
(2004). 
139 Judge, supra note 137, at 604 (“[P2P lending] was simultaneously heralded as potentially 
expanding the pool of persons who could obtain credit, enabling persons who might not readily qualify 
for a bank loan to nonetheless obtain needed financing.”). 
140 Id. at 609 (explaining that would-be borrowers had “the opportunity to tell their stories in their 
own terms,” and would-be lenders also had the chance to read these stories and compare competing 
requests). 
141 Id. 
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willing to take bigger risks and to make loans on more favorable terms to 
borrowers because they were able to get a more personal sense for a 
borrower’s creditworthiness.142 Borrowers could turn to the lending 
marketplace for loans when it did not seem worthwhile to go to banks or 
when credit card interest rates were too high.  
Over time, peer lenders wanted the same degree of creditworthiness 
upon which banks insisted.143 P2P lenders started to use the same metrics as 
banks, and P2P lending platforms began to serve more as underwriters of 
debt securities than as online spaces for individual borrowers and lenders to 
find each other.144  
Now, borrowers apply for loans on one part of the site, and accredited 
investors sign up on another part to invest in debt securities put together by 
the online lender.145 Lender-investors are assured that they are investing in 
quality loans. No longer does a member of the middle class decide it would 
be fun to invest $200 in someone else’s dream and surf over to the Lending 
Club to find the right recipient of their funds.146 
Fintech innovation has come to mortgages as well. Because of the size 
of mortgage loans and the regulations that attend mortgage loan origination, 
marketplace lending for mortgages is not direct P2P lending. Instead, the 
fintech company finances the loan, securitizes its mortgage portfolio, and 
allows accredited investors to invest in its mortgage backed securities. These 
firms, such as SoFi, may try to attract borrowers with high credit scores by 
promising social interaction with other borrowers (and with SoFi executives) 
or by offering only three or four loan products with simple terms.147 
Borrowers may feel like they are borrowing with and from friends, and so 
they may feel more comfortable with the process, trusting SoFi more than 
they would a bank. This may be an important way for fintech mortgage 
lenders to compete with banks. Competing first for the borrower’s trust and 
                                                                                                                     
142 Colleen Honigsberg et al., How Does Legal Enforceability Affect Consumer Lending? Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment, 60 J.L. & ECON. 673, 681 (2017) (describing the proprietary models used by 
marketplace lenders to rate the risk of particular loans while assessing the risk of various credit 
investments differently than banks would, and using more information than a simple credit score). 
143 Judge, supra note 137, at 605. 
144 Id. 
145 E.g., SoFi Mortgage Loans, SOFI, https://www.sofi.com/mortgage-loan/ (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018); SoFi Private Placement, SOFI, https://www.sofi.com/investing-resources/ (last visited Aug. 25, 
2018). 
146 Judge, supra note 137, at 619 (“[T]oday’s lenders have no direct relationship with the borrower 
receiving the funds provided. Rather, they have a claim only against the lending platform. . . . Thus, when 
looking at the structure of the relationship—as opposed to the expected return on the investment—it 
begins to look a lot more like a traditional bank.”). There are platforms for such largess, but those more 
closely resemble crowdfunding (such as www.Gofundme.com) than traditional loans given in 
untraditional ways. 
147 Oliver Stanley, A U.S. Online Lender Keeps its Millennial Customers by Helping Them Find 
Jobs (and Friends and Life Partners), QUARTZ (Feb. 13, 2017), https://qz.com/905980/us-online-only-
lender-sofi-retains-millennial-customers-by-finding-them-jobs-and-life-partners/.  
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then providing simple, transparent loan terms the borrowers can easily 
understand would provide a more consumer-friendly experience than 
traditional banks offer.  
Other innovations in the mortgage lending space have used the 
technology provided by the Internet to streamline and simplify the 
application process. For example, Rocket Mortgage, owned by Quicken 
Loans, promises to give applicants simple loan choices appropriate for their 
circumstances.148 While these new approaches can be useful and save time, 
they fall short of offering borrowers different kinds of loans than other banks 
offer or more advice. They have focused on streamlining rather than 
disrupting the mortgage process. 
P2P lending and marketplace mortgage lending have identified holes in 
the traditional credit markets that lenders and investors in debt securities are 
willing to fill. P2P lenders have shown that some lenders may be willing to 
lend on a smaller scale to Alt-A or subprime borrowers for lower interest 
rates than traditional banks.149 Fintech firms may also be willing to help 
individuals reorganize their credit after banks have given up. They may also 
have identified an appetite borrowers have for a more personal experience 
and for more confidence that the loans they are agreeing to are affordable 
and understandable. Combining these insights might point to where new 
BSIs could start. 
Finding ways to lend to low-income borrowers without government 
involvement is difficult. Private sources of capital simply do not have to take 
the risk and so choose not to. Fintech’s attempts to reach underserved 
borrowers have failed to disrupt, or even significantly change, the consumer 
lending industry.150 While there may be a few exceptions, credit scores seem 
to be a good enough metric that tell enough of a story about a borrower’s 
credit worthiness to allow potential lenders and investors to decide whether 
to risk their capital.151 There may be money to make in these riskier markets, 
but the current crop of lenders does not yet have the incentives to take the 
time and energy to develop that business.  
B. The Consumer Assistance Industry 
Firms elsewhere in the financial services market are positioning 
                                                                                                                     
148 ROCKET MORTGAGE, http://www.rocketmortgage.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2018). 
149 Judge, supra note 137, at 625 (“Paying off an outstanding credit card balance with a three-year 
or five-year loan from a P2P platform avoids any such complications and typically enables the borrower 
to pay a rate of interest that is significantly lower than the interest rate she had been paying on that 
balance.”). 
150 Karan Kaul, Will Fintech Innovation Benefit Borrowers of All Incomes?, URB. INST. (April 16, 
2018) https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/will-fintech-innovation-benefit-borrowers-all-incomes 
(discussing fintech limitations in reaching underserved borrowers). 
151 See Judge, supra note 137, at 617–18 (discussing the role credit plays in the borrower screening 
process).  
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themselves to help unsophisticated and relatively less creditworthy home 
buyers and mortgage borrowers. Examples include Zillow and Realtor.com 
and their subsidiaries. Various firms also offer to help consumers track and 
better understand their credit.152 This Section will identify aspects of those 
businesses that BSIs could build upon, bringing together the strengths from 
other sources of help for consumers while adding a layer of sophistication 
that closes the gap between the borrowers and a successful, confident home-
buying experience. I will then show how true BSIs would develop from 
current business innovations.  
1. Real Estate Help 
Zillow is a large corporation that specializes in making real estate 
information such as home prices and values easily accessible to buyers. Its 
subsidiaries include Trulia, which is a real estate shopping website that 
allows anyone on the Internet to browse real estate listings anywhere in the 
country for free. In another spin-off, Zillow recently launched 
RealEstate.com, a tool that takes an interesting approach to giving borrowers 
more guidance about the costs of mortgage loans and what a prospective 
borrower can afford on a given budget.153  
RealEstate.com is targeted at first-time home buyers. It breaks down the 
monthly cost of purchasing a home with specific dollar amounts for 
individual fees and costs, including a utilities estimate, and provides users a 
total monthly price to compare to rent payments.154 One immediate 
shortcoming of the site in providing advice to borrowers is that it relies on 
the borrower to set her own budget. The borrower must arrive at a 
responsible view of what she can afford to pay each month on her own, 
without guidance from the site. RealEstate.com compensates for errors the 
borrower may make in budgeting by showing users homes well within and 
below their budget and only showing a few properties near the top of their 
budget.155 For example, using the traditional “two and a half times your 
income” metric, let’s suppose a person making $200,000 per year could 
afford a $500,000 home with a $3,000 monthly mortgage payment. Entering 
$3,000 per month and $100,000 down into the RealEstate.com budget tool, 
the most expensive property in the search was $500,000. The search results 
began with properties priced as low as $45,000. A user can overcome this 
by searching for a price range for the total list price rather than focusing on 
                                                                                                                     
152 See, e.g., CREDIT KARMA, https://www.creditkarma.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) (offering 
users the ability to monitor their credit and learn how to improve credit scores).  
153 Madeline Stone, Zillow is Launching a New Site Just for Millennials Looking for Their First 
Home, BUS. INSIDER (May 2, 2017, 9:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/zillow-launches-
realestatecom-for-millennials-2017-5. 
154 REALESTATE.COM, http://www.realestate.com/ (last visited June 8, 2017) (“Our All-In Monthly 
Pricing search includes estimated property taxes, HOA fees, PMI, utilities, insurance and closing costs 
to help take the surprises out of buying a home.”).  
155 Id.  
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monthly cost, but that would not take advantage of the chief advertised 
benefit of RealEstate.com, which is the help it provides in understanding 
how a particular mortgage payment would fit within a given budget, and 
would duplicate searches available on all other real estate listing sites.  
Strongly biasing search results to come in well below budget shifts the 
paradigm used by most home buyers, their real estate agents, and their 
mortgage lenders when searching for suitable homes. Many buyers may be 
biased in favor of finding the largest, most expensive home they can possibly 
afford. Real estate agents who want to close deals are unlikely to talk such 
buyers down. Buyers want larger homes with more amenities, real estate 
agents want larger commissions, and lenders like to write big loans with high 
interest rates. That kind of behavior contributed to the housing bubble and 
resulting crisis.156 Such over-optimism can lead to foreclosure. Designed to 
provide advice for first-time home buyers, RealEstate.com seems to be 
nudging buyers toward shopping conservatively by drawing their attention 
to all they can find for far less than the most they could possibly manage—
or not manage—to pay.157  
A disinterested third party focused on giving advice can try to nudge 
homebuyers in a more responsible direction. Zillow’s main home appraisal 
estimation business has become a key player in helping homeowners decide 
when to sell their homes and can act as a supplement to home-buying 
research in a given area. One could imagine Zillow and RealEstate.com 
putting together a suite of online applications that serve as a valuable source 
of advice and information as homebuyers approach the market. Armed with 
the tools such applications could provide, borrowers may be more 
sophisticated in their dealings with lenders and may have a better idea of 
how much they should borrow and on what terms. For instance, they could 
know in advance what their monthly payments and fees would look like and 
would be less likely to be surprised by higher-than-expected monthly 
mortgage bills. These kinds of tools may educate borrowers and 
simultaneously stifle some over-optimism. Further, because they will have 
looked thoroughly at a number of homes that are below budget for them, 
home buyers might be less likely to run to the upper-reaches of their 
financial limits.  
Another innovative source of home buying advice is Doorstepsbuy.com, 
which is owned by Realtor.com. There, buyers create profiles any time 
                                                                                                                     
156 See supra Part II.  
157 See Casey Fleming, Rent vs. Buy: Are You Ready to Own Your First Home?, REALESTATE.COM, 
http://www.realestate.com/first-time-home-buyers/big-decision/rent-vs-buy/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) 
(“If you work on commission, carry credit card balances every month and have just enough to qualify 
for the loan and close on a home, a large monthly mortgage payment might crush you if you have 
something like a car breakdown, medical emergency or job loss were to happen. You can probably get 
approved for a loan with a 43-percent debt-to-income ratio, but, man, are you sure? You are better off 
waiting or shopping for homes that would result in a monthly payment that’s 25 to 33 percent of your 
gross income.”).  
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during the home-buying process, up to years before the buyer is ready to 
make a purchase. The profiles capture information such as what sort of home 
the buyers are looking for, geographical areas of interest, and the features 
that are most important to them. Consumers also input information about 
their finances and are able to put together all of the information they will 
need for the mortgage application in their Doorsteps profile. Real estate 
agents and lenders can then pay a monthly fee to have a presence on 
Doorsteps that allows them to access their customers’ profiles to collect the 
information they need to serve their clients. Doorsteps does not charge home 
buyers, and its claimed services include:  
100% unbiased information, written by industry experts and 
insiders, so you can avoid all the homebuying mistakes that 
helped worsen the housing crisis of the last ten years. That 
includes overpaying for a home, a mortgage, or any one of the 
dozens of service providers you’ll need along the way. It also 
means finding the right people to support you – like inspectors 
or attorneys – and knowing they have the right information, 
presented in the right way, to be as efficient and effective on 
your behalf as possible.158 
Doorsteps also provides help through a chat function that connects 
directly to an in-house customer service agent.159 It is not clear how 
Doorsteps would prevent someone from “overpaying for a home” or a 
mortgage beyond giving conservative budget estimates once financial 
information is entered, but giving advice with those concerns in mind and 
orienting the buyer to the complicated process in a step-by-step way may 
help to overcome a fair amount of a first time buyer’s lack of sophistication. 
The Doorsteps mission shares some similarities with the goals of a BSI, 
but Doorsteps simply provides a platform for consumer communication with 
agents and lenders as well as generic advice which may be tailored to address 
particular financial profiles. It does not negotiate on consumers’ behalf or 
otherwise involve itself in the process. It is a helpful platform but does not 
go as far as a BSI could.  
One could easily see how a BSI could grow from these companies that 
provide advice and detailed information to consumers. Interest in their 
services indicates market interest for a BSI. These models for consumer 
information and advice represent helpful starting points for how a BSI could 
interact with buyers and help them understand the process while gaining 
enough information about a buyer to help the buyer find the right loan. As 
the next section will show, any company with access to a great deal of 
consumer data will have a natural advantage in taking steps to establish a 
                                                                                                                     
158 Our Mission, DOORSTEPS, https://doorstepsbuy.com/about_us (last visited June 8, 2017).  
159For Professionals, DOORSTEPS, https://www.doorstepsbuy.com/professionals (last visited Sept. 
7, 2018).  
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BSI. 
2. Credit Help 
Borrowers would benefit from advice serving their best interests, giving 
them the value of others’ experience and savvy. Loan originators and banks 
that make mortgage loans have seen enough loans and loan applications to 
know what circumstances are most likely to lead to default and foreclosure; 
they know safe loans from risky loans and under what circumstances riskier 
loans may work out.160 The benefit of that experience is rarely used to help 
borrowers make decisions that are best for borrowers. The incentives for 
loan originators are not aligned to encourage them to help borrowers. 
Competing with banks may be what it takes to encourage lenders to serve 
borrower needs beyond traditional financing.  
Using BSIs for consumer borrowing is not just a matter of adopting a 
different mindset when originating loans, it requires involving different 
actors in lending decisions. BSIs should be able to identify borrowers 
presenting different degrees of credit risk and to evaluate them to determine 
what kinds of loans make the most sense for them. A number of market 
participants have the raw materials necessary to develop the models that 
would be helpful in predicting the success of various loans.161 They may be 
able to sell that information to potential BSIs, but conflicts of interest may 
prevent them from doing so in a way that would benefit borrowers. 
Credit reporting bureaus are examples of firms with detailed financial 
information about prospective borrowers and sophisticated algorithms that 
predict borrower behavior and likelihood of repayment.162 Indeed, tracking 
and predicting creditworthiness is their main function.163 Credit reporting 
agencies lack the connections to borrowers and banks that would lead to 
them becoming captured by one or the other.164 A credit reporting agency 
would have a natural advantage in predicting what kind of home loan a 
particular borrower could repay and would be well-positioned to sell that 
information to interested parties. Because they place a premium on their 
ability to accurately predict borrowers’ creditworthiness, credit reporting 
agencies would not be tempted to recommend borrowers for more 
aggressive loans than a given borrower could afford.  
But it would be difficult for a credit reporting agency to build 
relationships with lenders and investors and to market themselves as 
helpers—rather than gatekeepers—to borrowers. It would require adding a 
                                                                                                                     
  160 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.  
  161 See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text for discussion of Zillow and Doorsteps.    
  162 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 148, 163 (2016).  
  163 Brooke Niemeyer, Who Are the Major Credit Reporting Agencies?, CREDIT.COM (Apr. 11, 
2018), https://www.credit.com/credit-reports/credit-reporting-agencies/.  
  164 See id. (discussing the role credit reporting agencies play in helping consumers and business 
owners in the lending process).   
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completely different division to their business and may include changing the 
goals of their credit modeling. Rather than warning lenders about which 
borrowers to stay away from, a matchmaking credit reporting agency would 
be trying to help even the less creditworthy borrowers find appropriate 
mortgage loans. That may undermine their central purpose of providing 
reliable predictions about how borrowers will behave and would present a 
conflict of interest that may be insurmountable.  
A better use of credit reporting agency data and modeling would be to 
create a division within the agency that sells specialized models to 
prospective lenders and BSIs. One important, though recently controversial, 
innovation of credit reporting agencies has been to sell credit monitoring 
subscriptions that give borrowers constant access to their credit reports and 
FICO scores.165 The promise of honest communication with borrowers about 
how lenders see them and where they stand when applying for loans is an 
important step that could close some of the sophistication gap between 
borrowers and lenders. In addition to credit tracking, a subscription for credit 
monitoring could tell borrowers what loan terms lenders are most likely to 
offer them as well as what loan terms they are most likely to be able to repay, 
at what cost, and over what period of time. The trove of information credit 
agencies have on hand is exceptionally valuable to both borrowers and 
lenders, and the agencies are just beginning to learn how best to sell that 
information to interested parties.  
Credit agencies cannot go quite far enough to truly close the information 
gap. The car sales market demonstrates some of the difficulty of having third 
parties provide pricing information to consumers. For example, consumers 
can look to Edmunds to appraise their cars for private sale or trade-in and 
can look at True Car to see the best prices others are receiving in their 
geographic area, but neither Edmunds nor True Car is available to actually 
provide that price to the conscientious consumer.166 Consumers can share 
those numbers with car dealers, and while that information may inform the 
negotiation or may even pressure the car dealer to some extent, at the end of 
the day, the car dealer can name a price and the consumer cannot turn to the 
third party firm to get the better deal it claims should be available.167 So even 
if a credit reporting agency says a borrower is qualified for a particular loan 
or should be able to receive a particular interest rate, that does not provide 
                                                                                                                     
165 See, e.g., Credit Monitoring, TRANSUNION, https://www.transunion.com/credit-monitoring (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2018) (advertising a subscription credit monitoring service for "the low monthly cost of 
$19.95 per month").  
166 See Car Selling, EDMUNDS, https://www.edmunds.com/sell-car/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2018) 
(offering tips on how to sell a used car, but no price guarantees); TRUE CAR, https://www.truecar.com 
(last visited Sept. 7, 2018) (advertising the ability to get a “trade-in True Cash Offer in minutes,” but no 
price guarantee from dealers).  
167 Indeed, this author has been invited to “go sell [her] car to Edmunds, then” by more than one 
car dealer.  
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any assurance that the borrower will be able to succeed in finding a loan on 
those terms.  
The recent dustup between the credit reporting agencies and the CFPB 
shows that the agencies are very comfortable telling borrowers what they 
want to hear on one hand while promising to be good gatekeepers for lenders 
on the other.168 Mortgage lenders also obtain far more information about a 
borrower’s financial situation than a credit reporting agency does or could. 
So while the agency’s metrics may work in broad strokes to convey 
information about where a borrower fits on a spectrum of borrowers based 
on past repayment behavior and outstanding credit, there is important 
information the credit bureaus may not have—current income, a new job not 
yet begun, a recent job loss, a recent marriage, a large loan or gift from a 
family member, or an inheritance—that would be essential to making a 
mortgage lending decision.  
Of course, the credit agencies could easily offer the information to 
borrowers, which could serve the purpose of making the borrower a better-
informed negotiator and shopper when looking to buy a home. The borrower 
could enter detailed information into a credit agency’s form as part of her 
credit monitoring service and gain a better understanding of what kind of 
borrower she is and what her budget is before she begins shopping for a 
home. The credit agencies could use their data and models to put that 
information in a form the borrower could easily use without attaching the 
advice to a particular lender, loan, or property. That would have the 
advantage of giving the borrower some of the information she needs without 
attendant social pressure from a real estate agent, a mortgage lender 
recommended by a real estate agent, or the desire for a particular home.  
BSIs could provide that service or buy the necessary data and algorithms 
from credit agencies. They could combine those resources with a long-term 
relationship with their borrowers to create an increasingly detailed and 
accurate picture of their borrowers over time so that the BSI could become 
an advisor upon whom the borrower relies again and again. The BSI’s 
interest in the long-term relationship with borrowers and the superior 
effectiveness of their product when part of a long-term relationship would 
help to protect borrowers against capture of the BSI by lenders. A BSI’s 
desire and incentives not to set its borrowers up for failure would also give 
lenders a place to go for responsible, well-vetted borrowers, lowering their 
costs of research and lending.  
BSIs may be tech firms, they may be financial advisors, or they may be 
                                                                                                                     
168 The CFPB found that Equifax and TransUnion had deceived customers by telling them that the 
credit scores they purchased from the credit reporting agencies were the same scores lenders used to 
make credit decisions. They were not. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, CFPB 
Orders TransUnion and Equifax to Pay for Deceiving Consumers in Marketing Credit Scores and Credit 
Products (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-orders-transunion-
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off-shoots of lenders. They may have any number of ways of signaling their 
incentives to borrowers and lenders. They may specialize in creating credit 
models and then using those models to match borrowers to the best loans for 
those with certain characteristics. Or instead, they might focus on customer 
service, offering a supportive borrowing experience with handcrafted loan 
products funded by outside lenders. In the likely regulation-free days ahead, 
there will be money to be made in finding ways to help borrowers 
responsibly navigate large personal financial transactions without winding 
up in a housing crisis, a credit crisis, or mass foreclosures. In the next Part, 
this Article suggests one specific way to provide that good. 
V. A BUYERS’ SIDE INTERMEDIARY 
The BSIs proposed by this Article would be a market response to a 
problem caused by a market flaw exacerbated by flaws in regulation. In an 
attempt to protect borrowers, regulation has mandated detailed disclosures 
of the terms that apply to mortgage loans.169 The disclosure is more than 
borrowers can easily read and understand, and the complexity of loan terms 
makes it difficult for borrowers to make informed choices about their 
mortgage loans. Moreover, the regulation is expensive for lenders, so it 
raises the costs of new lenders entering the market.170 As in other industries, 
mortgage intermediaries were allowed to grow in prominence as their roles 
and methods of payment became specifically enshrined in regulation. Every 
party consumers encounter in the mortgage borrowing process either works 
for lenders, or, at best, offers generalized advice about how the borrowing 
process usually works, with little individual consideration of borrowers’ 
interests.171 But there is room for disruptive innovation—for the market to 
begin to operate differently. BSIs could avoid the high costs of regulation 
by not becoming lenders or mortgage brokers themselves and could serve as 
learned intermediaries who help borrowers understand the terms that govern 
their mortgages.  
BSIs could operate as independent third parties to loan transactions. 
They could fill a market void by providing superior service and advice to a 
more diverse population of borrowers than banks currently serve. They 
could take care to have on hand a number of loan products from different 
banks to connect with their borrowers depending on the borrower’s needs. 
As third-party actors, BSIs would avoid some of the incentives lenders have 
                                                                                                                     
 169 See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text. 
 170 Jack Milligan, How Technology Alters the Reality of Regulatory Compliance, BANK DIRECTOR 
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://bankdirector.com/issues/technology/how-technology-alters-reality-regulatory-
compliance/ ("The banking industry spends an estimated $60–$70 billion a year on compliance, and 
many banks complain they have been forced to expand their compliance staffs in recent years just to keep 
up with the increase in regulations. Indeed, compliance-related activities can account for nearly 20 
percent of a bank’s overhead."). 
 171 See supra Part III.B. 
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that lead them to make loans to borrowers on troublesome terms. Freed from 
pressure to make a large number of expensive loans, BSIs would be able to 
give advice based on a particular borrower’s best interests, even offering 
conservative advice about how a borrower should proceed. A BSI would 
provide lenders with borrowers well suited to loan products individual 
lenders offer. Such borrowers, ideally, would have a lower rate of default 
than those screened less carefully or those screened using less accurate 
assumptions about creditworthiness. Banks would continue to lend on their 
own, but might “subscribe” to a stream of borrowers identified and 
counseled by a BSI. Such an arrangement, providing banks with borrowers 
in varying financial circumstances, would allow experimentation with new 
ways banks could outsource the identification and vetting of borrowers.  
A. What Would BSIs Do? 
BSIs are most likely to begin as small start-up operations. Large banks 
are unlikely to design new mechanisms for originating mortgage loans 
because they already have substantial mortgage businesses and they are 
subject to regulation that makes it difficult and expensive for them to 
innovate. Large banks are able to do “enough” mortgage business using 
traditional methods and would lack the inclination and perhaps the time to 
develop mechanisms for finding overlooked borrowers. Giving into path 
dependence would allow banks to originate loans more quickly. That, in 
turn, would allow them to lend to more borrowers and generate a volume of 
investment that should allow sufficient diversification to protect the banks 
from loan-specific risk. For large banks, high volume of loans is the goal.  
Smaller operations can focus more on the quality and specific 
characteristics of the loans they make because they will not be able to 
compete with banks on volume. They will be able to gain an advantage in 
different parts of the market by identifying alternative ways of doing 
business that may be more appealing to borrowers and investors. Innovation 
is how small firms compete with large, multinational banks. They have the 
appetite for risk-taking, as well as the flexibility to shift directions quickly 
to adapt to changing circumstances or setbacks. 
The chief benefit BSIs can market to lenders is the identification of 
creditworthy borrowers. The cost of acquiring borrowers is part of a bank’s 
lending business. BSIs would have to acquire new borrowers for banks at 
either a lower cost than the bank could alone or at a cost preserving the 
profitability of lending money to those borrowers. There has to be a reason 
to pay to subscribe to a BSI’s stream of borrowers. BSIs should start by 
identifying corners of the market in which they can specialize by producing 
borrowers that lenders may otherwise have trouble identifying or reaching. 
For instance, a BSI would go to lenders and pitch its ability to identify 
particularly creditworthy, but perhaps hesitant-to-buy, first-time 
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homebuyers.172 A BSI may be able to draw lenders in with its specialty in a 
particular kind of desirable borrower and then offer to connect the lender 
with carefully-vetted subprime or Alt-A borrowers. The goal would be to 
develop an ability to identify and cultivate borrowers and to offer to connect 
lenders to that part of the market in ways they may not otherwise be able to 
connect themselves.  
Then, just as securities underwriter would do, the BSI would negotiate 
the terms of the loans the lender would offer its borrowers. For example, a 
BSI might negotiate three loan products with each of three banks. A BSI 
could match its borrowers to loans from a number of lenders, but may only 
have one kind of loan it offers to borrowers with particular characteristics. 
That is, a borrower with a credit score of 600 who is buying a home for the 
first time and has selected a home well within her budget would be a good 
match for Loan One from Lender A, while the same borrower spending more 
money on her home might be a better fit for Loan Three from Lender B. 
BSIs would negotiate the loan products it recommends to its borrowers, 
organize those borrowers into groups according to their individual financial 
characteristics—determined by the BSI’s proprietary modeling of 
borrowers—and then match borrowers from the various groups to the loans 
that suit them best. Once the BSI finds the right match for that loan product, 
it puts the borrower and lender in touch so they can complete the transaction, 
having vetted each for the other and having advised the borrower about what 
the loan terms mean and how to proceed.  
The BSI provides a service for the lender as well as the borrower by 
negotiating a loan product it thinks it can place with the right kind of 
borrowers. The BSI’s superior knowledge of borrowers helps the lender   
create a loan product with particular buyers in mind. The BSI also performs 
a service for borrowers by negotiating appropriate loans on their behalf, 
saving them from having to navigate loan terms they can’t understand or 
accurately price for themselves. They may still have a choice among 
multiple-loan-products, but the BSI will be able to put those choices in 
                                                                                                                     
172 Millennials are an example of such a market. The hesitation of young adults to buy homes, 
particularly as compared with the home-buying practices of prior generations, is well-documented. See, 
e.g., Don Lee, Why Millennials are Staying Away from Homeownership Despite an Improving Economy, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0301-housing-economy-20160301-
story.html (outlining a variety of unique issues millennials face as a result of coming of age during the 
Great Recession and its impact on the housing market); Gail MarksJarvis, Why Millennials are Finally 
Starting to Settle Down and Buy Homes, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 7, 2017, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-millennials-finally-buy-homes-0409-20170407-story.html 
(“Weighed down by massive student debt and job struggles, the generation brutalized by the Great 
Recession has lacked both the money and the desire to buy homes. They’ve been a generation of 
renters.”); Derek Thompson, Millennials: The Mobile and the Stuck, ATLANTIC (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/08/millennials-the-mobile-and-the-stuck/497255/ 
(arguing "that the decline in homeownership is a bifurcated phenomenon, with two extreme adulthood 
tracks . . . the supermobile and the stuck[,]" with the supermobile coming from richer districts with more 
access to education, and the stuck being those who grew up in poor neighborhoods).  
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perspective so the borrower can understand. For instance, sharing with the 
borrower anticipated risk of default for loan options can provide the 
borrower confidence about which choices would be responsible and 
affordable. 
The borrowers would benefit from being “discovered” by the BSI, and 
the stamp of approval from the BSI may help them borrow on better terms 
than may be available to them otherwise. BSIs would do well to maintain 
long-term relationships with their borrowers when they can. Not only does 
that provide a counterbalance to their long-term relationships with lenders, 
but it also provides multiple opportunities to conduct business with the 
borrowers as they borrow money over the course of their lives. BSIs would 
not be limited to helping borrowers with mortgages. Borrowers would 
benefit from being “BSI Borrowers” as that may give them access to more 
and better loans and help them navigate the credit markets in a more 
sophisticated way. With a trustworthy source of advice and access to 
appropriate loans, “BSI Borrowers” may find access to the comforts of the 
middle class without losing everything for obligating themselves to debt 
they cannot service.  
A BSI should develop a reliable model that measures the riskiness of the 
loans offered to each borrower. That kind of transparency would be useful 
to both borrowers and lenders. Borrowers could easily understand how risky 
their loans are, which will give them valuable information about whether to 
borrow under particular terms. Borrowers could choose from a variety of 
home price, APR, and payment term combinations and easily see which 
combination would be the most challenging and how likely they are to be 
able to repay each option. If APR were more accurate, the relative riskiness 
of various options might be even clearer to borrowers. But many borrowers 
focus on monthly payments in the near term and may not understand how 
risky a payment may become in the longer term.173 Bond issuers receive a 
rating before the offering that tells them, and the market, how risky the bonds 
are. Mortgage borrowers would benefit from similarly clear information 
about the risks loans present, not just to lenders, but to the borrowers 
themselves. The subjective harms of home foreclosure are much more 
significant to a borrower than the risk of default is to a well-diversified 
lender. Of course, some borrowers and lenders will still choose to take big 
risks. The market should work more efficiently if everyone understands how 
big of a risk they are choosing with their investment decisions. 
Transparency, not just disclosure—and perhaps, as opposed to disclosure—
is the goal. 
Of course, as Levitin has pointed out, such information is only truly 
useful to lenders and investors if the BSI can accurately model the credit risk 
                                                                                                                     
173 Bar-Gill, Consumer Contracts, supra note 46, at 776. 
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posed by borrowers with those attributes.174 One problem with developing 
such models is that they can take time to devise and refine before they are 
reliable, and the factors affecting them may change too quickly for the model 
to keep up.175 The riskiness of investments in mortgages is a dynamic 
variable. It is difficult to pinpoint the stability of the market or the riskiness 
of investments in it even when considering only traditional loans and 
securities. Defining classes of borrowers who would not necessarily receive 
loans on the traditional market would present a new difficulty. BSIs’ 
borrowers would not necessarily have the same risk profile as other 
subprime borrowers because BSIs would take care to find borrowers with 
special characteristics and match them to appropriate loans, making them 
more likely than other subprime borrowers to repay. BSIs would also, 
ideally, design or lead borrowers to loans that would improve the chance of 
repayment.  
While BSIs would be able to develop useful, individualized profiles of 
borrowers, they would not take the time or effort nor incur the costs of long-
term personalized counseling. That is, they would offer generalized advice 
appropriate to a borrower with a specific financial profile and would be 
available to offer individual advice when needed. But BSIs are not hand-
holders. To extend the metaphor a bit, a BSI advises on a good match, but is 
not the borrower’s best friend and confidant. To update the metaphor, a BSI 
is eHarmony to banks’ Tinder.176 A BSI’s strength is its propriety modeling 
of borrowers, collecting particular information and weighting it 
appropriately to arrive at a better assessment of the borrower’s finances than 
is otherwise available. That information can help the BSI provide general 
advice for all borrowers with similar financial attributes and also to provide 
specific advice as needed based on the financial characteristics the BSI has 
ascertained. BSIs are not likely to invest in hours-long conversations with 
borrowers over the course of months or years about the benefits of particular 
homes to buy, particular financial decisions outside of the mortgage or other 
loan being matched, or life generally.  
A chief difficulty facing BSIs as small-scale, “specialist” actors in the 
mortgage market would be finding metrics to identify the borrower 
                                                                                                                     
174 Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private Risk 
Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 160 (2012). 
175 Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, Credit Scoring and Loan Default, 2–4 (Research Div., 
Fed. Reserve Bank St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2011-040A, 2011), 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2011/2011-040.pdf. 
176 I am indebted to Manuel Utset for this observation. For those who don’t know, eHarmony uses 
a long questionnaire to evaluate its users and match them to each other based on carefully calculated 
assessments of personality traits, and what traits may be compatible. Tinder simply provides a platform 
for users to see photographs of other users and then match to each other quickly to begin a conversation. 
Tinder users make their first assessments based on appearance and are not aided by an algorithmic 
modeling of their personalities or their compatibility with other users.  
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population that the traditional banks are missing. As Kathryn Judge pointed 
out in an article about fintech lending, P2P lenders that started with the goal 
of disrupting lending actually fell back to using traditional metrics and 
lending to traditional prime borrowers.177 Enticing investors to lend outside 
of the mainstream can be difficult. Safe investments are generally easier to 
market. But more personalized lending could help to resolve market failures. 
The potential is there if only the right entrepreneurs figure out how best to 
calculate and execute the risk. 
BSIs, as described here, would not be classified as mortgage brokers 
because they would not originate loans. That would allow them to avoid a 
large swath of expensive regulation and open up the ways in which they 
could communicate and negotiate with lenders in the interests of borrowers. 
The next Section details elements of BSI compensation that will be 
important to help avoid the perverse incentives other intermediaries have 
given into in the past.  
B. BSI Compensation 
Maintaining a BSI’s independence would be crucial to providing a new 
market actor that could avoid many of the dangerous pitfalls that seem 
inevitably to lead large-scale consumer lending to failure. A BSI must not 
have incentives to make improvident loans or to put borrowers in the riskiest, 
most expensive loans their incomes and credit scores can possibly justify. 
This section suggests contract-based mechanisms to ensure a BSI’s 
independence. A BSI’s independence will depend, in large part, on how the 
BSI is paid. Any number of contracts with borrowers and lenders could 
define a BSI’s pay in a manner to preserve its independence or to provide it 
with the “right” incentives, whatever the borrowers and lenders decide those 
incentives should be. One could imagine a variety of schemes competing 
before determining which incentives and pay structures attract the most 
borrowers and lenders to the BSI’s services.  
In one possible payment arrangement, the BSI would collect flat fees 
from the borrower and the lender. The borrower would pay a small fee that 
might vary depending on the complexity, but not necessarily the dollar value 
of the loan. Loans with variable interest rates, interest-only loans, loans that 
require private mortgage insurance, loans with no or low down payments, 
jumbo loans, etc. would qualify as more complex than, say, twenty percent 
down, thirty-year fixed rate mortgages. A borrower could be given a choice 
among different loans—a simple, easily affordable loan and more complex, 
more expensive loans. The fee paid to the BSI would be higher for the more 
complex loans, both to discourage the borrower from taking the more 
complex loan and to signal the higher risk the borrower would be taking by 
choosing the more expensive loan. More complex loans may also require 
                                                                                                                     
177 Judge, supra note 137, at 605. 
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more work on the part of the BSI, both administratively and in finding a 
matching lender, so the higher fee could also be justified that way.  
Lenders could “subscribe” to a BSI’s services by paying a subscription 
fee for making their loans available to the BSI’s borrowers. The fee could 
vary in size depending on how many borrowers the lender is matched to or 
how many loans the lender negotiates with the BSI for offer to the BSI’s 
borrowers. In order to convince lenders to take new risks on BSI borrowers, 
BSIs may have to guarantee some early loans, at least for a few years. While 
that would align the BSI’s interests with a lender’s interest in being repaid, 
it would not give BSIs incentives to match borrowers to excessively risky 
loans and would also align the BSI’s interests with the borrower’s interest 
in not suffering a foreclosure. In order to maintain independence, it is 
important that the BSI’s pay be connected to neither the amount of the loan 
nor the riskiness of the loan.178 The effect of the higher fee BSIs would 
receive for complex, and so perhaps riskier, loans should be overcome by 
borrower preferences not to pay a higher fee and the BSI’s responsibility for 
guaranteeing some early loans. 
An important feature of the arrangement between lenders and BSIs 
would be a reduction in the fees lenders pay for loans that default or are in 
arrears at the end of the given time period. Such a term would enhance the 
BSI’s incentives to make loans borrowers can afford and to vet borrowers 
carefully, and it would give lenders some assurance that the BSI is, in fact, 
being careful. In a way, the BSI would have to stand by its product, 
compensating the lender for harms resulting from putting the wrong 
borrowers in the wrong loans. As mentioned above, a BSI may have to 
guarantee some or all of the loans it matches at the outset. But after that 
period is over and lenders have more confidence in the BSI’s track record, 
this kind of fee arrangement could ensure that BSIs have some skin in the 
game. 
C. New Ways to Help Borrowers 
One way to pursue the goal of maintaining long-term relationships with 
borrowers would be to help them with more than just borrowing. BSIs could 
help borrowers save for a down payment and perhaps use that saving 
function as a way to give itself borrower-side incentives. For example, a BSI 
could set up low interest savings accounts that borrowers could then use as 
down payments for homes. Interest earned by the BSI from the deposits 
would help fund the work BSIs do on borrowers’ behalf. Then, perhaps, 
                                                                                                                     
178 However, the lender and BSI may define a loan of a particular size, say a “jumbo” loan, that 
might pay the BSI more. Loans that are large are unlikely to be given to borrowers who are not prime 
and who are not able to put down considerable amounts. While there may still be a potential for abuse, it 
is much smaller and borrowers shopping in that neighborhood are likely to be wealthier and more 
sophisticated than average. 
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from the same pool of returns, BSIs could offer some degree of matching 
when the money is used for a down payment, thereby giving the borrower 
incentives to go through with buying a home and using that money for the 
down payment.  
Funds distributed from a Roth IRA will not be taxed as income if they 
are used for a down payment on a first home.179 A similar tax exemption 
could apply to funds withdrawn from similar BSI accounts. Such legislative 
incentives to use BSIs would be akin to the regulatory breaks companies like 
Uber can get by serving underserved populations.180 In order to maintain the 
favorable tax treatment, BSIs could commit to focusing a certain percentage 
of their business on certain underserved borrowers.  
Another step BSIs might take is to insure the borrower against the risk 
of foreclosure. Private mortgage insurance currently protects lenders against 
the risk default of underwater mortgages.181 Borrowers have even more to 
lose from an inability to pay their mortgages and have no similar protection. 
Of course, protection against an inability to pay one’s mortgage could create 
a serious moral hazard, discouraging people from paying even if they can, 
but that result would just be a matter of arriving at the right price and the 
right terms for the right benefit. For example, the borrower could be insured 
up to a certain amount of the down payment, which represents many 
people’s life savings up to that point in their lives. So, if a home is foreclosed 
upon, the borrower might be able to collect from the insurance a certain 
amount of that cash outlay to allow them to find and get into a new place to 
live. BSIs would have to set premiums and the circumstances under which 
the insurance would pay out carefully, perhaps working in conjunction with 
lenders to find the right balance. But such a scheme might really help the 
honest but unfortunate homeowner. 
 BSIs would add value to the mortgage lending market in several ways. 
First, small, relatively nimble internet companies with low overhead would 
be able to devote time and attention to finding borrowers who would 
otherwise be locked out of the mortgage loan market. Recent regulation may 
have left some worthy borrowers without banks willing to lend to them and 
BSIs can fill that gap.182 Most importantly, BSIs would have incentives to 
serve both borrowers and investors in the loans. To attract the best 
borrowers, a BSI would have to develop a reputation for designing 
                                                                                                                     
179 Sean W. Mullaney, More Than Just a Diploma: Roth IRA Conversions Sheltered by the Lifetime 
Learning Credit, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 436–37 (2007) (citing I.R.C. § 72(t)(2)(F)).  
180 See Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, But for Local Government Law: The Future 
of Local Regulation of the Sharing Economy, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 901, 957 n.305 (2015) (providing 
examples of Uber exchanging regulatory exceptions with local governments for promises to provide 
services that taxis do not). 
  181 What is Private Mortgage Insurance, CFPB, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask/cfpb/what-is-private-mortgage-insurance-en-122/ (last updated 
Jul. 28, 2017).  
  182 See supra Part II.   
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consumer-friendly loans—loans that the borrower could reasonably be 
expected to repay on reasonable terms the borrower can easily understand. 
In order to attract equity investors, BSIs would have to attract lenders to 
have loan products to offer their borrowers on favorable terms. BSIs would 
have to be able to describe the risk presented by an investment in each kind 
of loan it offers. As with any matchmaking situation, the BSI is only 
successful if the parties are happy to have found each other. 
VI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO SUPPORT BSIS 
If BSIs catch on, they will surely be regulated. Significant players in 
financial markets always are. Fintech firms and other starts-ups often meet 
with regulators early in the lives of their new businesses to lobby for 
regulations that will keep them honest, but allow them to operate profitably 
and compete with existing firms.183 It is important for any new player to have 
an idea of how regulation could protect and affect its business model. This 
Part will consider legal rules, both common law and potential regulation, 
that would support a BSI’s mission while protecting consumers from the 
risks they face in interacting with an intermediary in the mortgage market. 
It is important that common law doctrines of contract enforcement and 
fiduciary duty be allowed to dominate to the extent possible. Specifically 
regulating a new intermediary locks in certain aspects of that intermediary’s 
business, whether good or bad for consumers, and stifles innovation and 
change. 
Relationships between BSIs and borrowers and BSIs and lenders would 
be contractual. Contracts with lenders would be negotiated by sophisticated 
parties and are not likely to require special attention. Gaps in those contracts 
would be filled by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  
The primary relationship that requires attention and protection is the 
fiduciary relationship between BSIs and borrowers. Because BSIs will be 
agents and advisors of borrowers, they must be held to fiduciary standards. 
A buyers’ side intermediary must unequivocally represent and work for 
buyers. Fiduciary obligation will bar BSIs from conflicts of interest for 
which they do not have the borrower’s consent.184 It will work to allow 
courts to rule against and provide remedies for deals BSIs may make with 
lenders that compromise borrowers’ interests. Because fiduciary 
enforcement is flexible and post hoc, it provides a means to address any kind 
of arrangement that gives BSIs interests that conflict with those of 
borrowers, however unpredictable. The flexibility the common law doctrine 
of fiduciary obligation provides is ideal for an emerging industry that may 
                                                                                                                     
183 Pollman & Barry, supra note 12, at 406–08. 
184 Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209, 224 (2005) (arguing 
that fiduciaries consent to forego self-interested behavior); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 926 (2006). 
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grow and change faster than regulation can be enacted. It also allows BSIs 
to experiment with a variety of arrangements while sorting the good from 
the bad. 
Though fiduciary duties can be considered catch-all gap-fillers, 
fiduciary relationships can benefit from broad, expressive regulatory 
guidance. Professional responsibility standards, for example, inform 
fiduciary relationships between doctors and lawyers and their patients and 
clients.185 Regulation of BSIs could state what goals a BSI should pursue in 
good faith and also specify the kinds of conflicts of interest BSIs would be 
prohibited from engaging in and from waiving. A regulatory statement of 
BSIs’ purposes would have expressive value by guiding the industry to 
comply with norms for its behavior.186 BSIs should work in good faith to 
find affordable loans for the borrowers they help, to match borrowers to 
loans that are suitable for the borrower’s financial condition, to provide 
borrowers a realistic view of their individual budgets, and to negotiate loan 
products with simple terms are that are appropriate for that borrower’s 
financial literacy. The notion of suitability has a securities regulation 
analog—brokers must only recommend securities that are suitable for a 
given client’s financial circumstances.187 Once these standards are 
articulated, they can give shape to a borrower cause of action to remedy 
injuries suffered as a result of sharp dealing by a BSI.  
The legal framework suggested here should serve as a useful starting 
place that will not burden a new industry with overly-specific rules. I 
intentionally do not suggest specific standards for determining who may 
serve as a BSI or how a firm might “qualify” to become a BSI. Lenders and 
venture capitalists are likely to provide a good check on inexperienced or 
inappropriate entities trying to become BSIs. Lenders simply will not do 
business with unqualified entities. Licensing requirements also tend to be 
overly burdensome and expensive, and there is no indication yet that detailed 
licensing rules would be necessary here. Such regulation should be 
considered if and when it becomes necessary, and by then the precise nature 
of that regulation would be more apparent.  
                                                                                                                     
185 For the AMA Code of Ethics, see AM. MED. ASS’N, AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS (2016), 
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ighlight=2111#r15663 (requiring that a broker-dealer or associated person “have a reasonable basis to 
believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities is 
suitable for the customer . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Consumer borrowers are largely unprepared for the complex financial 
transaction that accompanies buying a home. Consumer regulation has been 
enacted to try to help borrowers understand mortgage loans better, but those 
regulations have fallen short and are likely to be repealed in the near term. 
Low-income borrowers are underserved, and banks have failed to find 
innovative ways to reach them without engaging in the irresponsible lending 
that led to the last financial crisis. The market is ripe for a business to step 
in to solve this problem—to serve and help borrowers and to connect them 
to lenders through carefully chosen loan products that consumers can 
understand and afford.  
The BSIs suggested by this Article would be a market solution to this 
problem. Tech companies and firms that operate in the consumer financial 
markets have devised new ways to serve consumer borrowers. A BSI can 
help borrowers overcome their relative lack of sophistication while putting 
borrowers in mortgages they have a good chance of repaying as agreed. The 
flexible common law provides the necessary tools to protect borrowers and 
allow growth and innovation in the new industry. Regulation should only 
broadly supplement the common law, not replace it. Regulation should not 
step in to specifically define BSIs or the rules they must follow. Such 
specific regulation tends to entrench high costs and to create a harmful path 
dependence that keeps markets in intermediaries from adjusting to better suit 
the needs of the less sophisticated parties they purport to represent. 
 
 
